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INTRODUCTION: CHANGING TIMES

On the late afternoon of June 28, 1865, Captain Thomas G. Young, master of the
whaleship Favorite, defiantly stood atop the roof of his cabin, brandishing revolvers and bomb
guns. His courage, perhaps inspired by liquor, was stout in the face of the nearing Confederate
ship. He determined his ship would not be like the other thirty-one New Bedford whaleships that
fell to Confederate pirates since 1862. Fearful for their captain’s life, his crew pleaded with him
to stand down. Any fight he made would be fruitless and would probably end up killing him. But
Young was a desperate man and refused to surrender. He made his desperation known when he
proclaimed to his crew “I have only four or five years to live anyway, and I might as well die
now as any time, especially as all I have is invested in my vessel, and if I lose that I will go home
penniless and die a pauper.” His crew was not sympathetic with his desire to die heroically.
Before abandoning their captain and surrendering to the Confederate sailors, the crew members
removed the percussion caps from Young’s weapons, rendering the pieces useless.
As a boarding party from the CSS Shenandoah, the feared Confederate commerce raider
which did more damage to New Bedford’s whaling industry than any other, prepared to board
the Favorite, Captain Young, holding his guns in a menacing manner, told the Confederates to
“Stand off!” When the unfazed Confederate naval officer advised Young to surrender or the
cannons of the Shenandoah would blow his ship away, Young replied “Blow away my buck, but
may I be eternally blasted if I haul down that [American] flag for any cursed Confederate pirate
that ever floated.” With that, Young pulled the trigger on his bomb gun, intending to blast the
Confederate officer to kingdom come, but all he heard was a “Click.” With no percussion caps
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on any of his guns, he was defenseless. Even the defiant Young had no choice. He surrendered to
the Confederates.1
Young’s stand gained an almost mythic status in New Bedford. Headlines proclaimed
him as “The Man who Defied Waddell the Pirate.” He stood as the one example of bravado in
the face of an unforgiving enemy. For decades of New Bedford residents and historians alike, his
stand was an example of the desperation felt by those in the industry who realized this was the
beginning of the end of whaling. To them, whaling was dying and there was nothing that could
be done about it. Historian Leonard Ellis believed Young’s example was something to be
admired. He stated “He exhibited a brave and determined spirit, worthy of a Yankee captain.”
And yet to Ellis, Young’s stand also symbolized an end for many in New Bedford. Following his
account of Young, Ellis concluded “Enough has been given to show how much the whaling
industry had been crippled.”2
These conclusions are flawed at best. Young has become a straw-man. His grand tale of
desperation was fueled by liquid courage rather than moral fortitude. Several accounts, most
notably Lieutenant Cornelius Hunt of the Shenandoah indicated he was “three sheets to the
wind” when captured. This drunken, ill-advised stand symbolized for many historians how the
war financially destroyed those involved in the whaling industry.3
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Whalemen’s Shipping List, New Bedford, MA, 9/26/1865.

Whalemen’s Shipping List, 9/12/1865, 9/19/1865, 9/26/1865, 10/3/1865; Leonard Ellis,
History of New Bedford and Its Vicinity, 1620 -1892 (Syracuse: D. Mason and Company, 1892),
424-425; Eric Jay Dolan, Leviathan: The History of Whaling in America (New York: W. W.
Norton and Company, 2007), 329 -331; Thomas Chaffin, Sea of Grey: The Around-the-World
Odyssey of the Confederate Raider Shenandoah, (New York: Hill & Wang, 2006), 275-277.
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Cornelius E. Hunt, The Shenandoah, or the Last Confederate Cruiser, (New York: G.
W. Carleton & Co., 1867), 200.
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The story of the crew members who attempted to convince their captain to stand down is
more illustrative of how most in New Bedford reacted. Contrary to popular belief these men
were not resigned to defeat, but they engineered a different kind of victory than Young imagined.
Yes, they survived capture, but they experienced more success than that. This victory came in the
months and years that followed the war with the payment of insurance claims and an
international tribunal known as the Alabama Claims. Even Young, prepared to die rather than be
captured, recouped all his losses from insurance payments made almost a year later. He did not
“die a pauper” as he prophesized, but rather lived out the remainder of his life comfortably in
New Bedford.4 Most New Bedford whalers enjoyed similar success. With insurance and
international claims recouping all loses, significant capital flowed into New Bedford following
the Civil War.
The destructiveness of Confederate commerce raiders had another added benefit for the
whaling industry over the course of the war. The whaling fleet shrunk by nearly forty percent.
Between old whaleships sold as part of the Stone Fleet, vessels destroyed by Confederate
commerce raiders, and other vessels that never left the port during the war years, fewer vessels
went to sea. With fewer vessels whaling, New Bedford produced less oil. Following a time in the
1850s where the industry grew larger than its markets, the American Civil War provided a
welcome reprieve from declining prices. Prices rose dramatically during the war years because of
a decrease in supply of product. Sperm oil prices rose from $1.36 per gallon in 1859 to $2.55 per
gallon in 1866. There was a similar increase in whale oil prices from $0.48 per gallon in 1859 to
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Insurance records, housed in the Swift and Allen Collection, New Bedford Whaling
Museum, indicate Young not only recouped his initial investment but he also was paid for about
78% of the product onboard at the time of capture.
3

$1.45 per gallon by 1865.5 For those who sent whaleships to sea during the war years, potential
for profit increased significantly.
Increased profits led many to reinvest in whaling. Recovering from the Panic of 1857 and
the overproduction of the late 1850s, many like William Gifford renewed investments in the
industry, and by the late 1860s, whaling rebounded. But by the 1870s, with increased
competition resulting from the refinement of crude oil, markets were once again unfavorable.
Arctic disasters compounded these negative factors, and the slow decline of whaling renewed.6
However, for some like Matthew Howland, availability of capital during the American
Civil War offered another opportunity. Steam-powered industrial mills gained popularity by the
mid-nineteenth century. No longer tied to water-power, places like New Bedford, which had
limited energy-producing water sources, could build their own mills. Having ready access to coal
via shipping routes, the number of steam-powered mills in New Bedford increased exponentially
during the latter half of the nineteenth century. By the dawn of the twentieth century, New
Bedford was one of the leaders in steam-powered mills in the nation.7
Historians have paid little attention to the events that surrounded New Bedford during the
Civil War. Often relegated to footnotes, passing statements, or perhaps, at best, a chapter, the
war’s effect on the burgeoning capital of whaling is largely overlooked. The one full length work
Collected from editions of the Whalemen’s Shipping List, 1859-1866. Prices have been
normalized to 1860 dollars. All subsequent references to money have been normalized to 1860
dollars.
5
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Swift and Allen Collection, New Bedford Whaling Museum.

7

Financial Records of Matthew Howland, Harvard School of Business; William Heath
Kingston, “Whalers to Weavers: New Bedford’s Urban Transformation and Contested
Identities,” in Society for Industrial Archeology, 40, no. 1/2 (Houghton, MI: Michigan
Technological University, 2014), 13 – 15; Patrick M. Malone, “Steam Mills in a Seaport: Power
for the New Bedford Textile Industry,” in Society for Industrial Archeology, 40, no. 1/2
(Houghton, MI: Michigan Technological University, 2014), 108-136.
4

that investigates the city during the war years is Earl Mulderink’s New Bedford’s Civil War.
Published in 2012, Mulderink’s book is riddled with factual inaccuracy. Quotes are attributed to
the wrong people, statistics cited have no factual base, and there is more conjecture than
historical fact. Although Mudlerink does a decent job of describing the involvement of the 54th
Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry Regiment and the city’s critical role as a hub for fugitive
slaves on the Underground Railroad, his study of the whaling industry during the war is
inaccurate. A simple glance through Mulderink’s notes and bibliography indicate gaping holes in
his research.8 His effort at depicting New Bedford’s “Civil War,” a problematic title in and of
itself, meant the work was of little value for this thesis.
Two earlier historians each spent a chapter discussing the community’s involvement
during the Civil War. Leonard Ellis in his work, The History of New Bedford and Its Vicinity,
1620 – 1892 and Pardon Gifford’s Famous Fleets in New Bedford’s History were published in
1892 and 1939 respectively. Both works specifically focus on the Stone Fleet and pay only
passing attention to the work of Confederate Commerce Raiders and their effect on the industry.
Although both works provide a great chronology of the events as they transpired, both
misinterpret the event as a great act of patriotism.9 There certainly was a great deal of patriotism
once the community found out why these vessels were purchased, and the community happily
bid farewell to the vessels with much fanfare. But when the vessels were bought, no one had any
knowledge that the government was purchasing these ships or for what purpose. It was clearly
specified in the orders issued by government operative George D. Morgan that the purchasing
8

Earl Mulderink, New Bedford’s Civil War (New York: Fordham University Press,

2012).
9

Leonard Ellis, History of New Bedford and Its Vicinity, 1620 -1892 (Syracuse: D.
Mason and Company, 1892); Pardon Gifford, Famous Fleets in New Bedford’s History (New
Bedford: Reynolds Printing, 1939).
5

agents, I. H. Bartlett and Sons, were to operate clandestinely buying the vessels while not
admitting they were working for the government.10 This meant that the merchants and agents
who sold their old whaling vessels did so with no knowledge that they were aiding the war effort.
It was simply an act of economic necessity. Instead of allowing the old ships to continue to rot,
they sold them to these willing buyers, and they made a large sum of money. It made economic
sense, and the sale had nothing to do with supporting the war effort.
This singular example is emblematic of the case of New Bedford during the American
Civil War. The few historians who have wrote and spoke about New Bedford’s whaling industry
during the war have all framed it within the context of the destruction of the industry, and New
Bedford’s “noble” effort to counteract the cursed rebels. In reality, the war was a great
opportunity for economic growth and development in the community. Whaling was slowly
working towards its demise in the United States, and the American Civil War provided those
most pragmatic among the whaling tycoons the opportunity to invest in the burgeoning industrial
movement. And it was this investment in industrialization that made New Bedford an
economically sustainable community well into the twentieth-century.
These facts are in line with historians Charles Beard’s and Louis Hacker’s arguments in
the early twentieth-century, that the striking achievement of the war was “the triumph of
industrial capitalism.” Industrialism triumphed in New Bedford in the years following the
conflict, as New Bedford began its transition from “whalers to weavers.”11

10

Gifford, Famous Fleets, 1.
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Charles Beard and Mary Beard, The Rise of American Civilization (New York:
Macmillan Press, 1927); Louis Hacker, The Triumph of American Capitalism: The Development
of Forces in American History to the End of the Nineteenth Century (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1940), 373; William Heath Kingston, “Whalers to Weavers: New Bedford’s
Urban Transformation and Contested Identities,” in Society for Industrial Archeology, 40, no. 1/2
(Houghton, MI: Michigan Technological University, 2014), 13 – 15.
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Although this transition to textiles appears to exemplify Beard’s arguments of a Second
American Revolution which resulted in the triumph of industrial capitalism, New Bedford’s
ideological beliefs and the effect these played are contrary to part of Beard’s argument. Prior to
the war, New Bedford was a hub of abolitionism. A main stopping point on the Underground
Railroad, New Bedford drew animosity from Southerners. Whereas Beard believed the war
resulted from divergent economies, which resulted in a “social cataclysm” between capitalists,
laborers, and farmers, New Bedford’s antebellum years highlight the importance the issue of
slavery played in the growing division between North and South.12 The plight of the slave
echoed in the churches, lyceums, and halls of New Bedford. This cause for which many
endangered their own well-being to help fugitive slaves, underscores the importance of
ideological differences between North and South. Although Beard diminished the role slavery
played in the conflict, New Bedford’s abolitionist ideology and the resulting tension and
animosity incurred on them from the South, demonstrates the critical role the peculiar institution
played in drawing the nation closer to war.
Beard’s arguments are not only flawed in this aspect when it comes to New Bedford’s
story. The Civil War certainly solidified the role industrial textiles played in New Bedford for the
next century, but this was not really a “revolution.” Whaling was a major industry which
demonstrated the ingenuity of the whaling merchant. Combining both horizontal and vertical
integration, whaling tycoons turned a simple fishery into a burgeoning industry. Industrial
capitalism “triumphed” in New Bedford long before the first textile mill was built in the
community. Granted, it was not the tradition image of industry, but a whaleship was as much a
factory as the textile mill. The Civil War simply enabled whaling merchants to apply their

12

Beard, The Rise of American Civilization, 54.
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capitalistic skills to a new industry: textiles. This transition was not a revolution at all, but simply
was a realigning of finances behind a new enterprise. This was still critically important. It was
this transition which ensured economic stability in the community for the next century, and the
Civil War was the catalyst for this transition.
The American Civil War was a turning point for New Bedford. It neither caused the
demise of the whaling industry nor did it save the industry. It was an opportunity for some to get
out of the industry, or at least to reduce their involvement in it. For others the war provided a
temporary stimulus, which increased profits during and immediately following the war. In this
way the war temporarily stalled what was the slow but steady decline of the industry throughout
the remaining decades of the nineteenth century. Ultimately, the war created opportunities for
those who wanted to adapt. Unwilling to succumb to the adversity faced during the war years,
the community adjusted, taking advantage of the positive potentials for change the war offered.
Ironically, this new investment in textiles was not as sustainable as they hoped. By the 1920s,
many mills moved South in search of cheaper labor and lower production costs. Even though
hard times remained ahead for New Bedford, this change staved off economic decline for nearly
a half a century. Much like the nation itself, the American Civil War produced a more adaptable
and sustainable New Bedford, for a time.

8

CHAPTER 1. “THE BURGEONING OF THE VILLAGE:” NEW BEDFORD AS THE
PREDOMINANT WHALING PORT

Nestled on the shores of the Acushnet River on the south coast of Massachusetts, New
Bedford was one of the best ports in the whole state. The deep harbor accommodated ships of all
tonnage and drafts, and it protected these vessels from the dangers of the temperamental Atlantic
Ocean. For centuries, the natural advantages of the area provided a safe and abundant home for
members of the Wampanoag tribe. Settled by Europeans in the mid-1600s, the town of Old
Dartmouth became an escape for the fringe elements of Plymouth society. Religious, political,
and social outcasts settled this frontier region. Members of the Society of Friends or “Quakers”
were among the earliest European inhabitants.
Although some of these residents dabbled in off-shore whaling as early as the lateseventeenth century, this industry did not become the central economic force in the village until
the 1760s. In May 1765, Joseph Rotch, a prominent Nantucket merchant and Quaker, purchased
a large tract of land from Joseph Russel along the banks of the Acushnet River. Rotch utilized
this land for ship building, whale oil processing, and offices. He expanded his whaling
enterprise, and became the leading mogul in the developing village. As historians Christina
Arato and Patrick Eleey argue “To Joseph Rotch is credited the capital and expertise that led to
the rapid development and remarkable success of the whaling industry and, consequently, the
burgeoning of the village.” This small village, called Bedford, grew larger throughout the
remaining decades of the eighteenth century. 13

13

Christine Arato and Patrick Eleey, Safely Moored at Last: Cultural Landscape Report
for New Bedford Whaling National Historical Park (Boston: Olmsted Center for Landscape
Preservation, 1998), 2-7.
9

As the village expanded, whaling became an increasingly instrumental part of the
settlement’s economy. The growth of Bedford made it a target of the British during the ongoing
conflicts with the colonists and then the young American nation. During the war for
Independence, the village harbored privateers who attacked British shipping. In retaliation,
British forces burned the village to the ground. The war also forced some prominent whaling
families into exile because of their questionable allegiances during these conflicts. William
Rotch Sr., an open supporter of the crown, left for Canada because his political views alienated
him. A little over two decades later, the issues of impressment and embargoes before and during
the War of 1812 left whaleship owners in an industry-wide recession. 14
But for those who survived the wars, the golden age of whaling began. As domestic and
international markets for whale products increased, the whale fleet grew. Whale oil was the
predominant illuminant for street lamps, lighthouses, and in private homes. Rendered down from
the blubber of a whale, the oil burned brighter and lasted longer than other lighting sources. The
assertion that New Bedford “lit the world” was only a slight exaggeration. Other whale products
such as ambergris, a bile from a whale’s intestines used in perfumes, and baleen, the strainer-like
teeth of mysticeti cetaceans used for corsets, parasols, and buggy whips, were also valuable
whale products.
The most lucrative of all whale products was spermaceti. The spermaceti organ in the
sperm whale’s head, when processed, created the longest lasting, brightest burning candles of the
age. This product also served as the best lubricant for industrial machinery. Spermaceti products
14

Daniel Ricketson, The History of New Bedford, Bristol County, Massachusetts: A
History of the Old Township of Dartmouth and the Present Townships of Westport, Dartmouth,
and Fairhaven, from their Settlement to Present Time (New Bedford: B. Lindsay Printer, 1858),
70-79, and 278-300; Dolan, Leviathan, 139 – 204; Leonard Ellis, History of New Bedford, Part 2:
Biographical, 1-8.
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demanded high prices. Many whaleship captains obsessed over finding the sperm whale.15 But
sperm whales are predators. This meant encounters with a sperm whale were often dangerous.
After being harpooned, sperm whales were known for turning on the whale boats. The battle
between life and death was real, and whether man or whale would win was uncertain. The
ferocity of the sperm whale took on mythic proportions, inspiring books like Moby Dick and
expressions like “A dead whale or stove boat.”16 The battle between man and the great leviathan
was one for economic profit, and the potential for profit was great enough that many a whaler
risked his life for it.
The Rotch and Rodman families dominated the burgeoning industry in the village. Both
families, prominent investors in whaling, solidified their bonds by intermarriage. In a two year
span from 1780 to 1782, three of the Rodman children married three of the Rotch children. These
marriages of two Rodman sisters and one brother to two Rotch brothers and their sister limited
potential competition and conflict, pooled together the resources of both families, maximizing
the available capital and expertise, and created a multi-family dynasty. As other houses gained
economic status, they sought marriages between their heirs and the descendants of the RotchRodman clan. These social bonds created a web of interconnected families which looked more
like the royals of Europe than something that was found in the young Republic.17

15

Dolan, Leviathan, 39-40; Arato, Safely Moored at Last, 19-20.
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Mark Carwadine, Smithsonian Handbook: Whales, Dolphins, and Porpoises (New
York: DK Publishing, 2002), 12-13, 14-17, and 80 -89; Herman Melville, Moby Dick
(Hertfordshire, England: Wordsworth, 1999), 154.
17

Arato, Safely Moored at Last, 113; Ellis, History of New Bedford, Part 2: Biographical,
1-8, 27-29, 83; Peggi Medeiros, New Bedford Mansions: Historic Tales of County Street
(Charleston: The History Press, 2015), 15-46.
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But even the capital of these prominent families was not enough to fuel the expansion of
the industry by the 1830s and 1840s. Seeking more investors, whaleship owners utilized a
shareholder system to maximize investments and minimize risks. A joint-stock firm owned each
ship. This firm hired a representative, called an agent. The agent acted as the manager of the
vessel. He acquired “provisions and outfits,” purchased insurance, secured a captain and crew,
negotiated sales of product, and scheduled maintenance and repairs for the vessel. With daily
operations coordinated by the agent, the shareholders provided the capital and general guidance
for the agent’s activities. Shareholders ranged in number from as low as only one to as high as
twelve, but the typical number was around four or five.18
This diversification limited the risk any individual investor assumed. This allowed
investors to spread out their capital in multiple ships which limited their exposure to failure. If
one invested in five vessels, one ship might sink, another might have a low income, two might
have an average income, and one might have a high income. Ideally all of these investments
would average to an acceptable return on the initial investment. On the other hand, if one
invested in a single vessel, he could earn an extraordinary income or could be left a pauper.
Because whaling was such a risky business, it made the most economic sense to limit this
potential for complete failure by diversifying the portfolio of investments.
Skilled laborers profited from the growing number of ships in New Bedford. Blacksmiths
produced nails, harpoons, and other metal tools. Coopers crafted barrels for storing oil and
provisions. Sailmakers repaired and sewed sails. Carpenters, shipwrights, and caulkers built and
repaired whaleships, some as large as six hundred tons. Ropemakers twirled twine, producing
strong cordage utilized in the ship’s rigging. These craftsmen and more provided the necessary
18

Ellis, History of New Bedford, 5-8.
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support industries that enabled whaling to grow. For their labors, they were rewarded
handsomely, with the average artisan making around $15 a month in 1840. This income led
many artisans to open savings accounts in banks like the New Bedford Institute of Savings.19
Some of these artisans invested in joint-stock voyages. Insurance records list doctors, lawyers,
coopers, blacksmiths, shipwrights, and chandlers as part owners of some whaleships.20 With
additional capital provided by this growing middle class, risk was further mitigated and more
individuals gained the chance of economic gain from the developing industry. As the number of
investors increased, the fleet increased as well. Growing from a mere two dozen ships at the turn
of the nineteenth century, New Bedford was home to 320 vessels by 1854. This number
comprised approximately half of the 669 whaleships nation-wide that year. This number of
vessels ensured a regular return each year.21
Technological improvements also fueled the growing productivity of the industry.
Initially an off-shore endeavor, whaleships went out for only a few weeks at a time. Each whale
a crew caught was brought ashore for processing. However, as voyage length increased, it
became necessary to process the whales at sea. Owners began building tryworks on almost all
whaleships by the 1820s. These fireplace-like structures made of brick allowed whalers to safely
start a fire on board the ship and then render the blubber into oil without ever going ashore. This
ensured the blubber would not spoil or rot, allowing whalers to travel further away from home

19

Importance of mechanics in New Bedford evidenced in Zephaniah Pease, History of
New Bedford (New York: Lewis Historical Publishing Company, 1918), 37-41; Arato, Safely
Moored at Last, 5-9.
20

Swift and Allen Collection, New Bedford Whaling Museum.

Number of vessels in whalefishery compiled from Whalemen’s Shipping List, 18501880; New Bedford as the richest city in the country evidenced in, Arato, Safely Moored at Last,
34-26; Dolan, Leviathan, 206, 213-215, 221.
21
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for a longer period of time. This allowed whalers to journey to more lucrative grounds and
increased their capability to process large amounts of whales on one trip.22
These enhancements allowed whalers increased freedom of movement. With whale
populations in the Atlantic Ocean diminishing by the 1830s, New Bedford whalers journeyed to
more lucrative grounds. The Pacific and Indian Oceans contained plentiful supplies of right and
sperm whales. With the ability to process product on board and with ship sizes increasing,
whalers ventured to the opposite side of the globe to hunt the great leviathan. These voyages
lasted an average of two to five years, but this time invested was worth the potential profit. And
once whales became more difficult to find in these regions, whaling captains pushed farther
north into the Arctic Ocean. It was the advent of the tryworks that made this enhanced range for
whalers possible.23
Another major technological advantage was the toggle-iron harpoon. Lewis Temple, an
escaped slave and trained blacksmith, invented the toggle-iron around 1845. Temple adapted his
harpoon from one used by the Inupiat peoples of Alaska for centuries. It had a smaller surface
area which allowed for easier penetration of the whale’s blubber, and once firmly planted in the
whale, the head of the harpoon toggled or pivoted, locking the point firmly in place. This great
innovation limited the potential of the harpoon getting yanked out of place and the resultant loss
of a whale. This invention, with a few later adaptations, became the harpoon of choice for

22

Dolan, Leviathan, 205-210.

23

Ibid, 52.
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American whalers until the 1920s. The toggle-iron’s invention decreased the potential of losing a
whale and became a staple of the industry until the industry’s death.24
Technological advances combined with expanding capital and a growing number of
vessels led New Bedford to be one of the most affluent cities in the nation by 1854. The general
trend of whale oil and sperm oil prices from 1841 to 1856 was upward. As Chart 1 illustrates,
prices of sperm oil went from $0.53 per gallon in 1844 to a peak of a $1.81 per gallon in 1855.
Likewise, whale oil prices more than doubled from $0.30 per gallon in 1841 to $0.79 per gallon
in 1856. This rise in prices was coterminous with the rise of the whaling fleet.25 With potential
for profit so high, many in New Bedford sought a piece of this lucrative pie. Increased
investments in the industry matched the increased capital needed to fund more ships. With more
vessels leaving port in the early 1850s than ever before, new records were set for the most
vessels returning to New Bedford in a single year. In 1857 alone, 105 vessels returned to New
Bedford with whale products. This was the highest number of vessels returning to port in a year
in the history of whaling in New Bedford. These vessels produced 78,440 barrels of sperm oil
and 230,941 barrels of whale oil.26 Yet, these numbers were not the highest production to date.

Sidney Kaplan, “Lewis Temple and the Hunting of the Whale,” The New England
Quarterly 26, no. 1 (March, 1953), 79-80.
24

25

Whalemen’s Shipping List, 1841-1856. This prices have been normalized to 1860

26

Whalemen’s Shipping List, 1850-1857.
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This chart demonstrates the prices of both sperm and whale oil per gallon from 1841 to 1858.
These prices have been normalized to 1858 dollars.27

This chart records the number of ships involved in the whaling industry from 1850 to 1880. The
blue line shows the total number of whaleships in the entire country while the red line shows the
number of whaleships on the south coast of Massachusetts. This included the communities of
27

Graph compiled from Whalemen’s Shipping List, 1841 -1858.
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Westport, Acushnet, Fairhaven, Mattapoisett, and Marion. However, most of these vessels were
from New Bedford.28

In 1851, New Bedford whalers brought in 328,483 barrels of whale oil and in 1843 they
produced 166,985 barrels of sperm oil. These two years produced the most whale and sperm oil
respectively but these were just one small part of total increased production between 1841 and
1857. During that time, New Bedford whaleships brought in a grand total of 1,897,575 barrels of
sperm oil equaling about $700,000 and 4,148,006 barrels of whale oil equaling about $414,000.
Over $1.5 million were made in a little more than a decade.29 Whaling was a massive industry by
the 1850s.
The law of supply and demand implies that as production increases and the demand for
product decreases, prices drop. By the late-1850s, production was at some of it highest levels in
the fleet’s history. In fact, it was so high that not even high demand from the global market that
whalers enjoyed could meet the overwhelming supply they were producing. Product piled up on
the docks and in storehouses. Leonard Ellis, a New Bedford historian noted “Our idle wharves
were fringed with dismantled ships. Cargoes of oil covered with seaweed were stowed in sheds
and along the river front, waiting for a satisfactory market that never came.”30 With all this
unsold product, prices dropped. Starting in 1855, the prices of sperm oil decreased from $1.81
per gallon to $1.20 per gallon by 1858. Whale oil prices dropped sixty-five percent between
1856 and 1861.
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To make matters worse, economic depression struck in the midst of this industry-wide
decline. The Panic of 1857 left the nation reeling, and only furthered the woes of whaleship
owners in New Bedford. The number of outfitted vessels decreased during this period from 1857
to 1863. The same number of vessels were outfitted in 1857 that were outfitted in 1824. The
number of vessels returning to port by the outbreak of war in 1861 dropped to eighty-five.
Vessels returning to port decreased as low as sixty-six by 1863.31 This meant that by the 1860s,
New Bedford’s industry performed at half the capacity of what it had a decade before. This
decrease in outfitted vessels was a direct effect of excess supply and a crippled U. S. economy
which was driving down prices. This left increasing numbers of older whaleships in port.

This chart represents the number of whaleships returning to New Bedford yearly from 1856 to
1876.32
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The Civil War altered the downward trajectory of the whaling industry. With fewer
products being brought into port after 1857 and fewer vessels sailing for the whaling grounds,
prices once again increased. Agents sold off old stores of oil and with the outbreak of war,
product became more difficult to come by. By 1862 and 1863, New Bedford whalers only
produced 55,641 barrels and 62,947 barrels of sperm and whale oil respectively. These numbers
dropped even more for sperm oil to 33,242 barrels by 1865. This drop in supply combined with
diminishing stores led to increased prices. Sperm oil went from $1.20 per gallon in 1858 to $3.46
per gallon by 1866, and whale oil increased from $0.48 per gallon in 1859 to $2.17 per gallon by
1864.33 The war, in fact, provided economic opportunity for those hardy enough to weather
increased risks and overhead. The war readjusted the market. The shrinking size of the fleet as a
result of selling off old vessels to the government and the destruction inflicted by Confederate
commerce raiders decreased the number of vessels returning to port. This meant that stores of
whale oil had to be sold. As supply decreased because of the war, prices increased.
This increased profitability during the war years was short lived. Beginning in 1865 and
1866 prices declined again. Although production remained relatively stable from 1863 to 1879,
prices of sperm and whale oil dropped to $2.42 per gallon and $1.06 per gallon respectively. This
renewed downward trend was twofold. More vessels left port in the waning years of the war, and
by 1868, sixty-nine vessels returned to port stocked with product. This did not raise the supply
significantly enough to accommodate for this decrease in profit. The problem was that demand
for whale oil was declining because of petroleum. Discovered in Titusville, Pennsylvania in
1859, oil men refined this newly discovered material for mass-consumption as an illuminant by

Whalemen’s Shipping Lists, 1857, 1862-1866. These prices are normalized to 1860
dollars and account for inflation.
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the late-1860s. Crude oil, cheaper and easier to produce than whale oil, became the preferred
method of lighting for many Americans. Although whale oil burned in lighthouses and lubricated
the intricate machinery of textile mills well into the twentieth century, the market for the product
was declining.34 Decreased production and decreased prices were the signs that foretold the
dying days of the industry and the city which once lit the world.

This chart shows the prices normalized to 1860 dollars. Both the prices of sperm and whale oil
are included.35
A new industry provided hope for New Bedford. The advent of steam-powered mills
opened New Bedford to the potentials of industrial production. With easy access to coal,
courtesy of coastal shipping routes, New Bedford mills proliferated. The story of New Bedford
transitioning from “whaling to weaving” is not a new one, but how this transition happened has
34
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never been substantially explained by historians.36 It is not a coincidence that the influx of capital
resulting from the American Civil War occurred simultaneously with increasing numbers of
mills in New Bedford. In an ironic turn of events, the nation’s most destructive war actually
provided the necessary capital that enabled mechanical industrialization in New Bedford.
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CHAPTER 2. “THE HARBOR IS BETTERED:” THE STONE FLEET AND THE
BLOCKADE OF CHARLESTON HARBOR

On April 19, 1861, United States President Abraham Lincoln issued orders commencing
a blockade of all Southern coastal ports from South Carolina to Texas. A little over a week later,
on April 27, Lincoln extended the blockade to coastal ports in Virginia and North Carolina. In
order for this blockade to be effective, it would have to cover about 3,500 miles of coastline. As
J. R. Soley’s book, The Blockade and the Cruisers describes “The peculiar formation of the
shore, which gave almost a double coastline throughout, [was] penetrated by numerous inlets,
giving access to a complicated network of channels.” For even the largest contemporary navy,
this was impossible, never mind for the small, floundering United States Navy. Reflecting upon
the immensity of this task, historian James McPherson described the blockade as a “herculean
task.”37
International law necessitated quick action. Established by the Declaration of Paris in
1856, international law declared “Blockades, to be binding, must be effective – that is to say,
maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coastline of the enemy.” In order
for the blockade to live up to international standards, the U. S. Navy would have to deny access
to the Confederate coastline. This was further complicated because international law stated
blockades could only be legally binding when used against a sovereign power. The Lincoln
Administration refused to recognize the Confederacy as such. This political conundrum created
an international crisis in Washington. British papers bemoaned what they considered a “paper
blockade.” In July 1861, the London Times claimed it was difficult to find a crime “more
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atrocious than this.” Although egregiously exaggerated, this assertion created a diplomatic issue
Secretary of State William Seward and President Lincoln needed to address. Lincoln and Seward
debated how they could make the blockade binding while still maintaining the Confederacy was
not a sovereign nation.38
In the midst of this diplomatic crisis, the naval department needed to act. In April 1861,
the navy had forty-two ships at its disposal, and, of these, only twelve were available. Many of
these vessels were incapable of performing the duties necessary of blockaders. It was nearly six
weeks before any semblance of a blockade was evident. Alexander Bache, of the U. S. Coastal
Survey, proposed an idea to strengthen the blockade. Approaching Gustavus Fox, then chief
naval clerk, in late May 1861, Bache proposed the creation of an advisory board that would
report on how to strengthen the blockade and increase its efficacy. Fox took this idea to his boss,
the Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, who approved the idea and created “The Blockade
Board.” Secretary Welles appointed Captain Samuel Francis Du Pont as chairman and appointed
four additional members to the board including Bache. From late June to early September of
1861 the board produced six major and four minor reports. Historian Kevin Weddle states “The
board analyzed the coast from Virginia to Texas and recommended the most obvious method of
blockading: sinking old vessels laden with ballast to create material obstructions. The old
channels would be destroyed… making it ‘almost impossible, certainly very precarious’ for ships
to pass in the meantime.”39 This proposal was the genesis of the “Stone Fleet.” As the newly

38

Declaration of Paris, 1856; London Times, July 1861; James McPherson, Tried By
War: Abraham Lincoln as Commander in Chief (New York: Penguin Press, 2008), 9-36.
Kevin Weddle, Lincoln’s Tragic Admiral: The Life of Samuel Francis Du Pont,
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2005), 106; Soley, The Blockade and the
Cruisers, 35; McPherson, War on the Waters, 34; Weddle, Lincoln’s Tragic Admiral, 115.
39

23

promoted Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Fox took this proposal and made it his own. By late
1861 Fox was hard at work organizing the purchasing of these ships.
The procurement of ships was the first step in this process. Fortunately for Fox,
provisions had already been made for this. The U.S. Navy, being too small at the beginning of
the war to effectively carry out naval operations, was already in the market for ships. Secretary
Welles authorized his brother-in-law, George D. Morgan, a New York businessman, to purchase
ships to be used by the Department. Welles amended these orders with an additional directive to
“obtain twenty-five old vessels of not less than two hundred fifty tons each for the purpose of
sinking on the bar at Savannah.” Morgan purchased these ships at ten dollars per ton and an
additional fifty cents per ton of stone was offered to any willing sellers. Morgan turned to the
maritime Northeast in search of these vessels. He focused on the two most important ports in the
region: New Haven, Connecticut and New Bedford, Massachusetts. Through an intermediary,
Richard Chappell of New Haven, Morgan contracted the firm of I. H. Bartlett and Sons in New
Bedford.40
Bartlett and Sons found no shortage of willing sellers. As New Bedford’s Republican
Standard reported nearly a month after the process of purchasing began “The government is
purchasing an immense number of old whaling vessels… No difficulty is encountered in
procuring all the vessels that are wanted.”41 Bartlett and Sons did their work secretively, strictly
obeying Welles’s orders. Welles demanded secrecy because he feared merchants would demand
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a higher price if they knew the government was buying. Sixteen vessels were sold by New
Bedford owners with no knowledge of who they were selling to. They simply knew Bartlett and
Sons acted as an intermediary for some unknown entity. Whaleship agents and the ownership
group acted not out of patriotism to help the war effort, but rather sold their vessels purely for
economic gain.42
Decades of success and production aged the fleet. Unwilling to send older vessels to sea,
these vessels cost money to moor at the docks and, quite frankly, were of little use. The average
age of New Bedford vessels was thirty years old by 1861. Some were over forty years old.43
The outbreak of war expanded the hardships whaleship owners faced. With the dangers of
whaling increasing as Confederate privateers patrolled the oceans, insurance rates increased by
nearly four percent. War premiums left many agents and owners wondering if it was even worth
insuring an older vessel. Just as insurance rates peaked during the war years, sailors on
whaleships argued for higher lays (pay). As a result of the increased danger, lays were raised
considerably.44 These increased expenses meant a shrinking profit margin. Matthew Howland, an
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agent and the brother of New Bedford’s mayor, George Howland, wrote in 1861
“Rebellion…seriously effects every kind of business in the country…Business is dull.”45 In the
early years of the war, since whaleship owners faced such stiff economic obstacles, business
suffered.
In this unstable, uncertain economic climate, Bartlett found willing sellers amongst New
Bedford’s owners. Many of these individuals, who since the mid-1850s refused to send older
vessels on voyages, could now sell these white elephants which had little economic value. Given
the age and state of most of these ships, they would make little on the open market. Commodore
J. S. Missroon of the Union Navy later remarked on the condition of the vessels he was charged
with sinking stating there were “but few good vessels among them and all badly found in every
respect.”46 Bartlett offered a good price for these vessels that an experienced naval officer like
Missroon found useless. With the typical whaling bark averaging anywhere from 250 to 500 tons
or more, the average New Bedford owner could expect between $2,500 and $5,000 for ships that
were idling in port. With such a great offer, many could not refuse it. Two agents, David B.
Kempton and Edward W. Howland, each sold two vessels each. The vessels sold ranged from
231 to 550 tons. In all, ten different agents sold sixteen vessels for a total price of $54,940.47
Others also profited off this enterprise. With fifty cents per ton of stone being offered,
farmers and landowners wildly tore down walls, fences, and foundations. Some 7,500 tons of
stone were collected. Over $3,500 was paid to numerous individuals who sold their old walls to
Matthew Howland, “Matthew Howland to Captain James Stewart,” Matthew Howland
Letter Book (Baker Library Collection, Harvard Business School), January 18, 1861.
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the government. As historian David Drury remarked “Generations of farmers had used those
walls to keep their cattle and livestock from wandering off. Now these stones were to provide a
different kind of barrier.”48 These stones provided both the weight necessary to sink these ships
to the bottom of Confederate harbors, and an economic stimulus to the economy.
Throughout the fall of 1861, New Bedford was alive with activity, outfitting the Stone
Fleet for its one way voyage. The Bartlett Company leased four wharves, located north of Union
Street, where they docked the newly purchased ships.49 Bartlett and Sons stripped the ships of
the excess equipment, which they then sold. With only the bare minimum equipment left
onboard, the ships were then prepared to sink upon command. Welles advised that the ships
should “Have a pipe and valve fitted under skillful direction so that after anchoring in position
the water can be readily let into the hold.” The agents bored a hole in the hull about two inches
above the light water line and inserted two plugs which were bolted together. The bolt past
through the center and was held by a wrench nut which could be unscrewed later. Once
unscrewed, the plugs could be knocked out and water would pour in.50
With the ships readied for their final voyage, Bartlett and Sons hired captains and crews
for these vessels. With perhaps the largest pool of sailors in the country, New Bedford was an
ideal place to find such men. They employed a captain, two mates, a cook, and nine additional
crew members for each ship. This was a skeleton crew considering these vessels were normally
manned by a crew of twenty to thirty. The government funded only the number of sailors that
48

David Drury, “Civil War’s ‘Stone Fleet,” The Courant, December 10, 2011.

49

United States Government, Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in
the War of the Rebellion, series 1, volume 12: South Atlantic Blockade Squadron, (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1901), republished, (Ithaca: Cornell University Library), 416 -418.
50

United States Government, Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies,

416.
27

was seen as “necessary” to safely sail the vessels. For their services the sailors received a modest
compensation. As for the captains, they were mostly old and past their prime but saw “Just
enough adventure in the enterprise to lend attractiveness to it.”51 Many sailors jumped at the
opportunity to make easy money, even if they could make more on a whaling voyage. This task
was much less risky and would not take as much time as a whaling voyage.
By November 15, sixteen former whaling vessels waited in the lower harbor of New
Bedford. With crews assembled and vessels ready, all that remained was the official order to sail
south. The captains of the fleet selected as their leader none other than Rodney French, and
dubbed him “Commodore.” Captain James Willis, master of the Rebecca Simms, described their
reasoning for selecting French in his account of the adventure: “Rodney… was a pretty good
fellow, told a good story and was generally liked by the rest of the captains… Rodney was good
enough for us.”52 Perhaps their reasoning for selecting French was more pertinent than he was
just a good guy.
New Bedford, a settlement of misfits and outcasts from its founding willingly accepted
other societal pariahs, including fugitive slaves from the Southern states. As the black
community grew, many whites and blacks alike joined the ranks of anti-slavery and abolitionist
societies. Perhaps one of the most outspoken of these was Rodney French. French’s candor won
enemies in the South, specifically in the coastal port of New Bern, North Carolina. Because of
his strong abolitionist writings, the people of New Bern banned French from conducting business
in that city. In 1851, the merchants of New Bern vowed “no support, no aid, no employment
whereby he [French] may receive one cent from us, a portion of the people of the South, of
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whom he has been so liberal in his abuse.” The fiery French responded that he would arm slaves
with “six barrel Pistols” and whatever “other arms you may require” to defend themselves from
slave catchers.53
Such threats, printed in the local New Bern paper, frightened many slave owners in the
area. This fear rippled out to the surrounding communities to the point where even in Charleston,
South Carolina, French’s name was synonymous with “abolitionist fiend.”54 To these
Southerners in New Bern and Charleston alike, men like French justified their feelings towards
abolitionists. Abolitionists sought to destroy their society and their way of life. On the other
hand, French saw this “Stone Fleet” venture as a chance to strike a blow at his Southern
nemeses. If he could not arm slaves, he could strike a blow at the slaveholders livelihood.
Although the captains of the Stone Fleet made it seem like they selected French because
he was popular amongst his colleagues, his involvement and interaction in the abolitionist
movement in New Bedford also played a role in his selection. French won great fame in the city
during the famous Liberty Hall incident in March 1851. When an unidentified vessel, feared to
be holding U.S. Marshalls and slave catchers entered the harbor, French ranged the bell in
Liberty Hall alerting all people of color that they were in potential danger. This proved to be a
false alarm; while papers in Boston derided the crazed French in cartoon caricatures, the people
of New Bedford thought differently. This was a powerful example of the character of New
Bedford. Historian Kathryn Grover argues that the incident “almost instantly became a legend,
tying in as it did so neatly to the use of the Liberty Bell in Philadelphia.” The Republican
Kathryn Grover, The Fugitive’s Gibraltar: Escaping Slaves and Abolitionism in New
Bedford, Massachusetts (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2001), 225-228; New
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Standard, a New Bedford newspaper referred to Liberty Hall as “the far famed temple of liberty,
within whose hallowed walls freedom for all men has been so frequently proclaimed, from
whose tower the note of warning to the poor, trembling fugitive from oppression, had so often
been sounded.”55
The captains of the Stone Fleet chose the very man who epitomized anti-slavery
sentiment in New Bedford as a reaffirmation of their views of the war and the Southern
aristocracy. This was an affront to Southerners. The man, whom many in North and South
Carolina hated most, was the one to lead this expedition to blockade their ports. Thereafter in the
papers and correspondences French was referred to as the “Commodore of the Stone Fleet,” and
his vessel, the Garland, became the fleet’s flagship.
Bartlett delivered sealed orders to “Commodore French” on the morning of November
20. The messenger directed French to keep his orders sealed until the entire fleet was at sea.
French led the fleet out of the Acushnet River, past Clark’s Point and the hordes of locals
bidding them farewell. People came from the surrounding communities and waved
handkerchiefs, flags, and hands as the vessels proceeded through Buzzard’s Bay and out into the
Atlantic. Once at sea, French and his fellow captains opened the sealed orders, which directed
them to Savannah Harbor. By the first week in December, most of the fleet arrived off the coast
of Savannah. The Official Reports of the Union Navy indicated that the vivacious French arrived
with a bang. Upon arriving in the harbor, he fired a salute from a small cannon he had onboard.
According to popular lore, when asked who fired the shot, French replied “The Commodore of
the Stone Fleet!”56
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As the fleet set out, many were optimistic about the fleet’s prospects for success. On
November 28, an article in the Republican Standard triumphantly claimed “The main ship
channel leading to Savannah, Georgia, is only 250 yards across in the narrowest place and can be
perfectly barred by 5 or 6 vessels… The powers of earth would find [it] rather difficult to be
raised.” The New York Times was equally optimistic. On December 10 an article claimed that
“with the Stone Fleet in the channel, it will be hard work for even a rebel cock-boat to make its
way up to the doomed city of Savannah without our permit.”57
Admiral Samuel Francis Du Pont, commander of the South Atlantic Blockading
Squadron, ordered the Stone Fleet to report to Commodore J. S. Missroon, the senior naval
officer at Savannah. As it turned out, Missroon was not informed about the Stone Fleet before it
arrived. Missroon, astonished that Du Pont sent him such vessels unfit for naval service wrote
Du Pont reporting “Seventeen ships and barks (chiefly old whaling vessels) had arrived… but
few good vessels among them and all badly found in every respect… Several had arrived in a
sinking condition.” Missroon’s fears were alleviated when Du Pont informed him the vessels
were not for fighting but were to be sunk to blockade the harbor. Missroon ordered the South
American sunk off of Tybee Island to serve as a jetty and wharf for Union troops, and the
Cossack beached for a similar purpose.58 Missroon abandoned the plan of sinking the remaining
ships in Savannah when the Confederates, fearing an invasion of Savannah from the sea, sunk
their own vessels to block the channel. With their work done for them by the enemy, Missroon
directed the rest of the fleet back to Charleston Harbor.
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On December 19, a large portion of the New Bedford vessels arrived and anchored just
outside of Charleston Harbor. Du Pont now placed the Stone Fleet under the direction of Captain
Charles Henry Davis, his chief of staff. In a letter to his family about “Mr. Fox’s pet idea,” Davis
wrote “I had always a special disgust for this business… I always considered this mode… of
doubtful success.” Nonetheless, Davis put great energy into this task, exemplifying great skill.
As a New York Evening Post correspondent described “The wrecks are not arranged in a straight
line across the channel. That arrangement might prove an effective blockade for a time, but not
permanently… if the usual ones [channels] were artificially closed, another would form
naturally.” Captain Davis arranged the vessels in a staggered fashion creating “an intricate
labyrinth, no one could navigate.” The USS Pocohontas and the USS Cahawba towed most
vessels into position, then after dropping anchor, the sinking began.59
On the morning of December 20, Captain Willis of the Rebecca Simms proudly wrote
that “It was just 9:45 [a.m.] when I drove out the plug below the water line in the ‘Simms’ and
then with my crew went on board the steamer ‘Sahawber’… I was the only captain of the fleet
that had this distinction.” Unlike the naval officers like Davis who thought this undertaking
foolhardy, Captain Willis and his fellow whaling captains were exuberant. Newspaper
correspondents shared in this optimism. A New York Herald correspondent wrote “At sunrise
today we began our labor again… the channel is effectually blockaded.” Ultimately twelve of
New Bedford’s whalers were sunk, most in the “Main Shipping Channel,” about three miles
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southwest of Morris Island. In late January 1862, the U. S. Navy sent a “Second Stone Fleet” to
Charleston Harbor. Ten of these vessels were from New Bedford.60
This ambitious plan proved to be an utter failure. The incessant pounding of the waves
and the weather in Charleston Harbor destroyed the rotting hulks. The stone cargo sank the
vessels deep in the mud, and this mud accelerated the vessel’s deterioration. Some historians,
like Sidney Withington, conjectured that “the vessels sank so low in the mud that they actually
deepened the channels they were attempting to block and even created new ones.” In 1863, just
a year later, the U. S. Engineering Department reported “Nothing in shape of channel
obstructions… could prevent or seriously retard the passage of our fleet up to Charleston.”61 The
endeavor was a complete failure.
Although the strategy of sinking old merchant vessels in Southern harbors failed to aid
the blockade, it did help the owners in New Bedford. In all, the U. S. Navy purchased twenty-six
New Bedford vessels, paying merchants a total of $86,420. Nineteen separate agents and dozens
of owners were the direct benefactors of this money. The purchasing of the fleet also shrunk the
fleet’s size by nearly twenty percent. This meant that there were fewer vessels in port, improving
the prospects of the remaining whalers.62
It was now a question of whether or not they should reinvest in the whaling industry.
Contrary to popular historical belief, the whaling industry was not dying by the outbreak of the
American Civil War, but was rather experiencing problems from over productivity. The price of
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both sperm and whale oil declined in a period from 1853 to 1861, while the production remained
relatively steady. It was the large amounts of oil in warehouses that produced this price decline.
Due to the success of whalers during the late 1840s and early 1850s, they harvested more whale
oil than there was a market for. Stores of oil built up, which drove prices down. The outbreak of
war in 1861 saw an almost instantaneous increase in prices for whale products. Sperm oil prices
doubled from $1.37 in 1861 to $2.70 by 1865, and whale oil increased even more, rising from
$0.50 in 1861 to $1.90 in 1865. Both threats to the industry and increasing demand caused
increased prices.63 Owners made a values decision on whether they should reinvest this new
capital in the industry which produced their wealth. Increasingly, many took this capital and
invested it in a more promising venture – industrial mills. Although this trend will be discussed
later, the purchasing of the Stone Fleet left many owners pondering what should be done with
this extra money they now had.

Prices (Normalized to 1861 dollars)
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This graph shows the price of sperm and whale oil during the Civil War years. This chart starts
in 1859 and goes to 1866. These prices were normalized to 1861 dollars.64

Even though the Stone Fleet positively affected New Bedford, it was difficult for some to
come to grasps with what happened to these once triumphant whaleships. The New Bedford
Republican Standard lamented “Each of them has a history and thousands of reasons suggest
themselves why the worn-out hulks still accounted seaworthy enough to voyage hither… should
not be saved their fate.” They were not saved their fate. Herman Melville, the author of Moby
Dick and New Bedford idol, analyzed the vessels’ demise in his poem “The Stone Fleet.” He
poetically concluded,
To scuttle them- a pirate deed
Sack them and dismast;
They sunk so slow, they died so hard,
But gurgling dropped at last.
Their ghosts in gales repeat…
And all for naught. The waters pass-Currents will have their way;
Nature is nobody’s ally; ‘tis well;
The harbor is bettered – will stay.
A failure, and complete,
Was your Old Stone Fleet.65
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CHAPTER 3. “I AM AFRAID I MUST BURN YOUR SHIP:” PRIVATEERS AND
CONFEDERATE COMMERCE RAIDERS

On April 17, 1861, the war came to New Bedford when Confederate President Jefferson
Davis issued letters of marque to private citizens. This allowed individual citizens who received
letters of marque to attack the Northern merchant marine under the sanction of the Confederate
government. Until the end of 1861, over two dozen of these privateers operated in the Atlantic
Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico. Although these privateers captured and destroyed thirty vessels
that year, three of which were whalers from Provincetown, Massachusetts, the privateers did not
do any major damage to the whale fishery.66
This limited success did not stop whalers from boisterously voicing their opposition to
these Confederate activities. A New York Times article, which appeared in the April 23, 1861
edition of the Whalemen’s Shipping List, proclaimed the outrage. The article stated “The letters
of marque and reprisal is a war upon private property, and stands in marked disgraceful contrast
with that of the President’s proclamation in which he declares that ‘the rights of private property
shall be respected.’ The next step of the Confederates in rebellion will be to confiscate all debts
from Southern men to Northern creditors.”67 This threat posed a dilemma for most New Bedford
merchants. If the Confederates continued, or worse, expanded upon this practice, their economic
wellbeing was at stake. Their investments, property, capital, and future wealth became a target of
this conflict.
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Regardless of the fear experience by whalers, Confederate privateers met with limited
success. As a result, the Confederate Secretary of the Navy, Stephen Mallory, realized that if
Confederate forces were going to cause any major disruptions to the Northern merchant marine,
they needed to take their work to the high seas. In early 1861, as the Confederate government
bought up every spare vessel it could, Confederate operatives purchased the merchant steamship,
Habana in New Orleans. The Confederate Navy commissioned the 473 ton vessel as the CSS
Sumter on June 3, 1861, and they placed Lieutenant Raphael Semmes in command. Mallory
tasked the fifty-one year old Semmes with breaching the blockade, sailing to the open ocean, and
doing “the enemy’s commerce the greatest injury, in the shortest time.”68 Unlike privateers,
manned by private citizens, commissioned sailors and officers constituted the crew of the
Sumter. They took their work away from the coast and out into the vast expanses of the Atlantic.
This cruiser was the first of the Confederate commerce raiders. Mallory and the Confederate
government hoped the Sumter could inflict enough damage to alter the course of the war. And if
this was not possible, they could at least draw Union naval vessels away from the blockade and
alleviate the tightening grip on commerce.
In late June 1861, Semmes and his crew broke through the Union blockade near the
mouth of the Mississippi River and headed towards the Atlantic. By the end of July, the cruiser
captured ten vessels off the coast of Cuba. Then it turned southward, towards the Brazilian coast.
In the following months, the Sumter captured five more vessels, and by December, Semmes
arrived in the North Atlantic. Semmes’s main target was the undefended merchant vessels that
journeyed through these waters from the United States to Europe. Semmes hoped that by
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patrolling the busy routes, he could capture heavily laden mariners, damaging the North’s
international commerce.69
Although he did not initially intend to attack a whaler, on the morning of December 8,
New Bedford received its first taste of what commerce raiding would mean in the coming years.
With a thick fog and rough seas, the crew of the Sumter barely spotted sails in the distance.
Approaching the vessel, Semmes showed the United States flag and the listing vessel did
likewise. Flying the United States flag or another neutral flag was common practice for
Confederate commerce raiders. They hoped this would lure unsuspecting U. S. merchants and
fishermen into a false sense of security, allowing the Confederates to get close enough to quickly
subdue their enemy. Seeing that the vessel was a whaling bark, the Sumter raised the
Confederate flag leaving the whaler with little chance to escape. The vessel surrendered almost
immediately. The boarding party discovered the bark was the Ebenezer Dodge of New Bedford.
Just twelve days out and bound for the Pacific Ocean, the Ebenezer Dodge hit rough weather and
sprung a leak. The damaged ship was of no value to the Sumter so after removing the provisions
and supplies, Semmes burned it. Taking the Ebenezer Dodge’s twenty-two man crew prisoner,
Semmes continued his voyage towards the Strait of Gibraltar where the cruiser added two more
captures to its log. In late January of 1862, damage to the Sumter forced Semmes to abandon his
damaged vessel at Gibraltar.70
Because the Ebenezer Dodge had just begun its voyage and was yet to capture a single
whale, the ship did not lose any product. But as the whaling bark burned, B. Franklin Howland,
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the vessel’s owner, lost nearly $35,000 of value in his ship and outfits.71 The Ebenezer Dodge
was relatively new, and Howland spent about $20,000 to outfit the vessel. The war had come to
New Bedford’s whaling industry. The Confederate crusade against whalers had begun.
While Semmes sold the Sumter off of Gibraltar, Confederate operative James Bulloch
was hard at work trying to provide another ship for Semmes. Bulloch worked the British market
searching for sea worthy vessels that could be commissioned in the Confederate Navy. This had
to be done clandestinely as to not violate Britain’s neutrality in the war. This was of critical
importance to the Confederate government. According to international law, Britain’s neutrality
meant the British government could not knowingly supply war material to either side during the
conflict. Eager to maintain this neutrality, Great Britain refused to openly help the Confederates.
This meant that Bulloch could not identify himself as a Confederate operative. He purchased
vessels under an alias and supplied the ships he purchased with materials from several different
chandleries.
Bulloch secured several purchases in the early years of the war, including the CSS
Alabama, which launched from Birkenhead Ironworks in Liverpool on July 29, 1862. The vessel
was 220 feet long and powered by both sail and steam. Since Semmes was without a vessel,
Bulloch summoned him to Liverpool. Semmes took command of the newly christened steamer,
and he took to the oceans in search of enemy ships.72
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Semmes decided on his first target shortly after the Alabama’s departure. In his memoirs
he recalled “I resolved to strike a blow at the enemy’s whale-fishery, off the Azores.” In late
summer, the Gulf Stream carries thousands of tons of krill and plankton northward from the
Tropics and dumps them off the coast of the Azores in the Northern Atlantic. For centuries, right
whales migrated to this location from late August until early October and feasted on ample
supplies of food in preparation for the winter months. Whalers journeyed to these waters to take
advantage of the gathering of right whales every year. This species of whale is docile and
relatively easy to hunt and kill. Whalers from New Bedford and other Northern ports frequently
made the Azores their first stop on their way to the Pacific and Indian Oceans, or their last stop
on the way home. This location also offered opportunity to hire experienced fishermen who
could be brought on as new crew members.73
With no protection offered by the U. S. Navy and numerous whalers congregating there,
these vessels were easy prey for the CSS Alabama. Semmes recorded in his memoir “Unlike the
ships of commerce, the whalers are obliged to congregate within small well-known spaces of
ocean and remain there for weeks at a time, whilst the whaling season lasts. It was the most
obvious thing in the world, that these vessels, thus clustered together, should attract the attention
of the Confederate cruisers.” Arriving off the Azorean coast in early September, his timing
could not have been better. He was on the whaling grounds at the peak of the season. His
aptitude paid off.74

York: Random House Publishers, 2009). Although these studies investigate the cruise of the
Alabama, none of these focus on the study of the effect the cruise had on the whaling industry.
This is the primary focus of this paper.
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Whalers were keenly aware of the predicament the nature of their industry put them in.
The merchant marine sailed either individually or in small groups, making them almost
impossible to find on the open oceans of the world. Unlike these mariners, whalers were found in
the same spots at the same times every year. The Whalemen’s Shipping List weekly obsessed
over the actions of Confederate commerce raiders in articles throughout 1862 and 1863. The
editors knew how vulnerable the whaling industry was, and their writings indicated how nervous
they were.
On September 5, 1862, the Alabama secured her first prize, the Ocmulgee, a whaler out
of Edgartown, MA. Just a mere eleven days after being commissioned, the Alabama made its
first capture. This was the first of many vessels that the Confederate cruiser added to her logs
over the next two years.
Three days after taking the Ocmulgee, the Alabama came across her first New Bedford
whaler. Late on the afternoon of September 8, the lookouts on the Alabama spotted a large ship
to the northwest. Sunset was nearing so the Confederates acted fast. Showing the American
colors as they approached, Semmes recognized the vessel as an American whaler. After securing
the vessel’s surrender, the ship’s master turned over his papers to Captain Semmes. These
identified the vessel as New Bedford’s Ocean Rover, which was returning from a nearly three
and a half year voyage with a hull full of oil. After spending several years in the Indian Ocean,
the captain of the whaler decided to make one final stop at the Azores to top off what was a
highly successful voyage. This decision proved an awful mistake as all the Ocean Rover’s hard
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work was burned later that night. The approximately 1,100 barrels of whale oil incinerated,
costing the owners and the crew of the Ocean Rover $70,000.75
This means of war was nothing new in the annals of history, and although Semmes
readily admitted to being a “commerce raider,” he believed this certainly did not make him a
pirate. Yankee whalemen did not think twice about economically attacking the South however
they could, and so Semmes felt no remorse for what he did. As he informed one disconsolate
whaler just before he burned his ship “Every whale you strike will put money into the Federal
treasury, and strengthen the hands of your people to carry on the war. I am afraid I must burn
your ship.”76 Semmes saw this as a means of war, as unconventional as it was. The more he
could limit the profitability of the Northern maritime industries the more he could hinder the
Northern war effort. To Semmes this was not piracy, it was war.
Semmes’s decision to burn the vessels was a difficult one for the captain. This whale oil
and product, if sold to European markets, would fetch a high price. Then that money could be
used to support the Confederate war effort. Yet, Semmes feared that putting into a neutral port
could cause an international crisis, which would potentially hurt the Confederacy’s cause. Also,
selling the whale oil would simply take too much time, and the longer he spent in one port, the
better chance a Union naval vessel had of catching him. He thought burning the ship and
destroying its contents was the best way to inflict maximum damage while not putting the
Confederacy’s international standing nor his crew in danger. Semmes also later commented that
“The New England wolf was still howling for Southern blood, and the least return we could
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make for the howl, was to spill a little ‘ile [oil].”77 This became the usual practice for
Confederate commerce raiders for the remainder of the war.
From September 13 to 17 the Alabama captured and destroyed four more New Bedford
whalers. The first vessel was the Altamaha which surrendered without a fight. Although this
vessel had been at sea for five months, the master had little success in capturing the great
leviathan. Semmes destroyed only about $3,000 of product.78 Later that night, with the moon
shining brightly, the Alabama spotted another whaler in the distance and made chase. It gained
quickly on the vessel and within a few hours the two boats were within a mile of each other.
Semmes ordered the customary warning shot fired and prepared his crew to board the vessel, but
this whaleship was not willing to give up. Captain Semmes was not in the mood to play games at
such a late hour and fired a second warning shot. This second round quickly brought the ship’s
master to his senses, and he immediately stopped his course and ran down his colors. It was now
nearly daylight so Semmes sent a boarding crew to the vessel and returned to his quarters for a
nap. When he arose that morning, he found the Benjamin Tucker of New Bedford was his new
prize. This whaler left New Bedford eight months prior and was off to a decent start on this
voyage with about three hundred and fifty barrels of oil onboard. The crew of the Alabama
gutted the Tucker of all valuable supplies and materials, brought the thirty person crew on board
the vessel, and set the whaler on fire by 10 AM. As the ship burned, nearly $18,000 worth of
profit burned with it.79
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Three days later, the Alabama added two more New Bedford whaleships to its list of
prey. The Confederates captured the Virginia and the Elisha Dunbar in the midst of a violent
storm. Both of these vessels were fresh out of port and neither had caught a single whale. What
they lacked in whale oil, these vessels made up in supplies and outfits. The Alabama pilfered
both for food and munitions before burning the vessels. This capture cost William Hathaway Jr.,
the primary owner of the Virginia, and the firm of W. and G. D. Watkins a combined $50,000.80
In only five days, the Alabama captured four New Bedford whalers which were worth
approximately $71,000. In 1862 the whaling industry brought in $5,051,782 of whale
products.81 These four days cost New Bedford owners approximately two percent of their entire
profit for that year. On the surface, these damages were not excessive. Thanks to insurance, New
Bedford owners monetarily rebounded from these loses. The true problem was fear. Fear kept
many owners and agents from outfitting vessels, and, as a result, they missed out on the
opportunity to potentially profit from the war time surge in whale oil prices.
By 1862, potential profit for whalers was on the rise. During the war years, a diminishing
of stores of oil combined with threats from Confederate commerce raiders increasing the danger
of a voyage caused an increase in the worth of all whale products. For those willing to accept the
risk, the war provided an opportunity for profit. This was especially true, if they could safely get
one of their vessels through the dangerous waters of the Atlantic and into the Pacific and Arctic
Oceans. Whalers might have to be on high alert in the Atlantic, where Confederate commerce
raiders prowled, but once they headed out on the vast Pacific, they could travel unmolested.
However, some were unlucky enough to cross paths with the Alabama on their way to the Pacific
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whaling grounds, as the master of the Levi Starbuck found. It was by pure luck that the Alabama
found this vessel. No longer on the whaling grounds, the two vessels merely happened upon each
other. The Levi Starbuck was only four days out from port and was stocked with fresh provision
and supplies. The whaler was just beginning a thirty month voyage to the Pacific Ocean’s
whaling grounds. This voyage was cut short by about twenty-nine months as the Alabama
burned the vessel destroying approximately $25,000 of outfits and supplies.82
Equally unlucky were the barks Lafayette and Nye. In April 1863, the Confederate cruiser
prowled the waters off the coast of Brazil and encountered the Lafayette, and easily captured the
vessel. The captain of the bark had died at sea several weeks earlier, and in a panic as the
Alabama approached, the first mate of the whaler threw the bark’s papers overboard hoping this
would mask their identity as an American whaleship. This act failed to save his ship, and within
an hour of her capture the whaling vessel was on fire, a fire that cost the owners of the Lafayette
$20,908.83
On April 24, the Alabama captured her ninth New Bedford whaler. This vessel was the
Nye which was returning from a thirty-one month cruise in the Pacific Ocean “during which her
crew had become almost as much Sandwich Islanders, as Americans in appearance.” The crew
had already shipped home two cargoes of oil, but still had about four hundred and twenty-five
barrels onboard as they returned home. The one remaining capstone to finish off such a
successful voyage would be to sail down the Acushnet River and into the harbor delivering these
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last barrels for their final payday. The Alabama would not allow such a triumphant return to port.
The overly oily Nye easily went up in flames and $31,000 worth of product was destroyed.84
All three of these vessels, the Levi Starbuck, the Lafayette, and the Nye were captured, in
a way, accidentally. None were caught on whaling grounds. They all were unlucky enough to
cross courses with the Alabama. A jubilant Semmes remarked “The fates seemed to have a
grudge against New England fishermen, and would persist in throwing them in my way, although
I was not on whaling-grounds.”85 Whether it was the fates or the vengeful whales which kept
sending these vessels the Alabama’s way, the effects of these unexpected encounters could not
be overlooked.
Encounters such as these were pushing New Bedford whalers to less lucrative whaling
grounds. From 1861 to 1865 the total tonnage of the American whaling fleet sailing to the
Caribbean rose exponentially. Beginning in 1831, whalers hunted in the Caribbean, but on
average only one or two vessels per year traveled to this region. This average remained constant
until 1861, when the average number of visits rose to ten. By the wars end in 1865, whalers
made nearly fifty voyages per year to the Caribbean basin. This dramatic rise of Caribbean
whaling was coterminous with the prolific cruise of the Alabama. Although some historians like
Aldermaro Romero have suggested that this had to do with lower labor costs in the West Indies,
it seems likely that Semmes’s raids had more to do with an increasing number of whalers visiting
less lucrative grounds.86
84

Semmes, Service Afloat, 611; United States Government, Official Records of the Union
and Confederate Navies, V.3, 679.
85

Semmes, Service Afloat, 611.

Aldemaro Romero, “Yankee Whaling in the Caribbean Basin: Its Impact in a Historical
Context,” New Approaches to the Study of Marine Mammals (Intech Open Science/Open Minds,
2012), 223 -232; J. L. Coleman, “The American Whale Oil Industry: A Look Back to the Future
86

46

In the Caribbean, right and sperm whales were sparse. Whalers mostly hunted humpbacks
in this region. These whales were poor producers of oil, meaning that whalers needed to catch a
lot more of them to produce a profit. But the Caribbean was closer to home and closer to the
Union Navy. This kept many Confederate raiders and privateers from operating in the region.
Many whaling captains made the decision to value safety more than lucrative grounds. As a
result, the number of voyages venturing to the poor whaling grounds of the Caribbean rose
dramatically. By 1870 only eight whaleships fished in the area. The dramatic rise of whaling in
the Caribbean with the outbreak of war and its abrupt fall after the war ended, indicate that
Caribbean whaling was likely a direct effect of the Confederate commerce raiders forcing
whalers to fish on less lucrative but safer grounds. Although the agents and merchants that sent
their vessels there did not have to worry about losing their ship, they experienced a noticeable
drop in productivity.87
By May of 1864, the Alabama had captured and destroyed fifty-five U.S. merchant
vessels equaling about $4,613,914 in damages. Of these, Semmes’s crew destroyed sixteen
whaling vessels, nine of those from New Bedford. This cost New Bedford merchants
approximately $218,000 worth of product, supplies, and vessels.88 As Semmes recognized, the
whaling fleet was one of the easiest targets. This fact was recognized by Confederate Secretary
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of the Navy Mallory and other Confederate officials who ordered Bulloch to purchase a new
raider that would strike a blow at that industry. As the Alabama sank at the hands of the USS
Kearasarge, Bulloch went about procuring a new vessel for this service.
He settled on an iron-framed, full-rigged ship with auxiliary steam power known as the
Sea King. Recently returned to England from Bombay, this vessel was perfect for a cruiser.
Bulloch began the painstakingly tedious task of buying and outfitting the vessel. The
Confederate naval department searched for a commander for this new vessel and settled upon
Lieutenant James I. Waddell. Waddell was a North Carolinian with over twenty years of
experience in the U.S. Navy. By mid-October, 1864, the Sea King, outfitted as a commerce
raider, was rechristened the CSS Shenandoah. It weighed anchor and set sail for the North
Pacific and the whaling fleet that called those waters home.89
Waddell’s orders from Bulloch, dated October 5, 1864, explicitly stated the purpose of
the mission. In the opening two sentences of this letter, Bulloch wrote:
Sir: You are about to proceed upon a cruise in the far-distant Pacific, into the seas
and among the islands frequented by the great American whaling fleet, a source of
abundant wealth to our enemies and a nursery for their seamen. It is hoped that
you may be able to greatly damage and disperse that fleet, even if you do not
succeed in utterly destroying it.
Building upon the easy success Semmes had off the coast of the Azores, the Confederate
government hoped Waddell could achieve even more success by attacking the much larger and
much more productive Pacific whaling fleet. If the Shenandoah was successful, it could
89
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permanently disrupt or even destroy the fishery. The Confederates needed a way to prolong the
war. If they could strike a major blow at the whaling industry, it would hurt the war time
economy, especially that of New Bedford.90 Maybe that would be enough to spark an economic
recession which could adversely affect the Northern war effort. Also, whalers in the Pacific were
sitting ducks, because the U. S. Navy provided no protection, and although they feared
commerce raiders, they never expected they would be attacked in the far reaches of the Pacific
and Arctic Oceans. A voyage like this one was an incredibly inexpensive way of inflicting
incredible damage on the Northern maritime economy. Ultimately, this would be the most
economically destructive cruise in whaling history.
Waddell and his crew caught their first whaler in the South Atlantic. It was about five in
the afternoon on December 4, 1864, in what Captain Charles P. Worth, the master of the idle
whaler, described as “thick weather.” With a fairly dense mist hanging over the water, Captain
Waddell stealthily directed his steamer towards the unsuspecting vessel and its crew. This was
the whaling bark Edward of New Bedford, which was in the process of “cutting in” a right whale
they had recently captured. Waddell dispatched a boarding party and by the time the busily
working seamen realized what was happening, it was already too late. Captain Worth
surrendered his vessel. The crew of the Shenandoah spent the next two days stripping the
Edward of all provisions. Waddell then burned the bark and transported his prisoners to Tristan
da Cunha, where he dropped them off on the island under the protection of the locals. Several
weeks later, the USS Iroquois retrieved the crew and delivered them to Cape Town, South
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Africa, where they spent several more weeks until finally making their return voyage home. This
first vessel was worth about $20,000.91
After a brief layover in Melbourne, Australia, the Shenandoah headed north towards the
Caroline Islands. It was in the harbor of Ascension Island (modern Ponape Island, Micronesia)
that Waddell located one of his keys to success. Four American whalers lay at anchor in the
harbor. Only one, the ship Hector, was from New Bedford. All of these whaling vessels had
nearly full holds. Between the Hector and the Edward Carey of San Francisco, the crew of the
Shenandoah found nearly five hundred barrels of whale oil. This was no minor sum, as these
were worth well over $73,000. Once the Confederates cleared the ships of everything of value to
them, Captain Waddell allowed the local islanders to loot the ships in exchange for the islanders
taking the Yankee prisoners. Following a day in which the islanders took anything left on the
vessels that had any value, the Shenandoah set the Hector ablaze. This cost the master of the
Hector well over $58,000, not to mention the permanent loss of his ship and his investments in
supplies.92
As successful as this was, the Confederates also fortuitously stumbled onto the key to the
New Bedford whaler’s undoing. Amongst the captured materials from the four whaling vessels
were the extensive charts and maps of the North Pacific whaling grounds. Now, Waddell was not
only armed with the precise charts necessary for navigating the often deadly northern Pacific and
Arctic Oceans, but he also knew the exact location of the whaling fleet. Waddell jubilantly
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recalled in his memoirs “With such charts in my possession, I not only held a key to the
navigation of all the Pacific Island, the Okhotsk and Bering Seas, and the Arctic Ocean, but the
most probable localities for finding the great Arctic whaling fleet of New England, without
tiresome search.”93 Waddell held the principal tools to completing the mission Bulloch sent him
on nearly six months before. Now all he needed to do was sail to the location where New
Bedford’s whalers congregated.
On April 9, 1865, Lee surrendered to Grant at the small crossroads of Appomattox Court
House, Virginia. On April 15, John Wilkes Booth assassinated President Lincoln in Ford’s
Theater in Washington D.C. On April 26, Johnston surrendered to Sherman’s forces on Bennett’s
Farm in North Carolina. With the war basically over, the Shenandoah arrived off the Kamchetta
Peninsula in northeast Russia in late May 1865. The Shenandoah captured the Abigail of New
Bedford, and with this vessel came another valuable resources for Waddell. The bark’s second
mate, Thomas S. Manning, joined the crew of the Shenandoah. Manning was originally from
Baltimore, Maryland, and sympathized with the Southerners. When the opportunity presented
itself, he joined the Shenandoah’s crew. Not only was he an experienced seaman, but he also
knew the approximate location of the whaling fleet that season. In conjunction with the captured
charts and maps, Waddell had all he needed to lead him to find the rest of the fleet.94
These two pivotal components enabled Waddell’s success. With the expertise of
Manning, an experienced whaler and the charts he procured, Waddell would not have to wander
about the far reaches of the North Pacific, hoping to find whaleships. Whale charts were precise.
Not only would a captain track the type of whales he caught in certain areas, but he also tracked
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the exact latitude, longitude, and even the time of year he captured them.95 These records,
intended to lead a captain back to plentiful whaling grounds each year, led the whaler’s enemy
right to them. Manning provided the additional information of not just where the fleet
historically had been but where the fleet was that season.
As Waddell’s crew captured the Abigail and brought Manning onboard, Captain
Ebenezer Nye, the master of the whaleship, was astonished. After expressing his disbelief, the
boarding officer from the Shenandoah slyly remarked “We have entered into a treaty offensive
and defensive with the whales, and we are up here by special agreement to dispose of their
mortal enemy.” Coincidentally this was not Nye’s first encounter with a Confederate cruiser
though. Several years before, he had been a master of another whaler which fell prey to the CSS
Alabama. One discouraged member of the crew proclaimed “You are more fortunate in picking
up Confederate cruisers than whales. I will never again go with you, for if there is a cruiser out,
you will find her.”96 Not only had Captain Nye lost a second ship and precious cargo, but his
reputation was tarnished. Tarnished reputations and bruised egos were often the byproducts of
interactions with these Confederate commerce raiders.
On June 21, the Shenandoah arrived at Cape Navarin in the Bering Sea, where the crew
picked up on a trail of floating blubber and smoke, sure signs that a whaler was nearby. They
found the William Thompson and Euphrates, both of New Bedford. The Shenandoah’s crew
made quick work of both ships, scavenging valuable rations, and then setting the ships ablaze
with their few hundred barrels of whale oil providing fuel for the fire.97
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After capturing the William Thompson, the Shenandoah received concerning intelligence.
The New Bedford vessel had recently stopped off in port in California on April 22 where the
crew heard news of President Lincoln’s assassination, the fall of Richmond, Virginia, and the
capture of Charleston, South Carolina.98 This news did not dissuade Waddell, who felt there still
was not enough evidence to substantiate the claims. He shrugged the rumors off as red herrings
and set his sights on more New Bedford whalers.
As June 22 dawned, the lookout on the Shenandoah glimpsed five more sets of sails. Two
of these belonged to foreign whalers, but the other three were New Bedford ships. One of these
was the Milo, which Lieutenant Hunt described as a “staunch and slow-moving vessel.” Easily
sailing up to the Milo, the Shenandoah captured her. The Milo’s Captain, Johnathan C. Hawes
was amazed that a Confederate cruiser was that “far north.”99 It seems that this was the general
consensus among whalers in the Arctic. In fact, many had gone that far north in the hopes that
this region would be a safe-haven from preying Confederate cruisers. The vulnerability of the
Shenandoah’s targets undoubtedly contributed to its success.
In the meantime, the other two New Bedford whalers tried to escape. The Sophia
Thornton was the slower of the two, and the Shenandoah easily caught up to her. After securing
this newest catch, the Shenandoah steamed after the last vessel, the Jireh Swift. A three hour
pursuit culminated with several warning shots fired from the Shenandoah’s thirty-two pound
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cannon and the capitulation of the Jireh Swift.100 In two days, Waddell captured five New
Bedford whalers.
Waddell’s success posed another problem: what should be done with all the prisoners?
He solved this dilemma by making a deal with Captain Hawes of the Milo. Waddell offered to
spare his vessel by bonding it if Hawes would take all the prisoners to San Francisco for him.
Hawes also agreed to pay $46,000 to the Confederate government for his ship. The prisoners
were loaded onto the Milo as the Jireh Swift and Sophia Thornton burned. Not surprisingly,
Hawes never paid the $46,000 bond to the then non-existent Confederate government and his
vessel was spared. Four vessels were destroyed, thousands of barrels of whale oil were burned,
and thousands of dollars of supplies, tools, and materials were lost. According to estimates, just
these two days cost New Bedford merchants $261,205.101 And the Shenandoah was not yet
finished.
On June 26, the Shenandoah caught three more prizes, including the Nimrod captained by
James M. Clark from New Bedford. Like Captain Ebenezer Nye of New Bedford’s Abigail,
Captain Clark also had his fair share of run-ins with Confederate cruisers. James Clark was the
master of the Ocean Rover two years earlier when Raphael Semmes and the Alabama captured
and destroyed his whaling bark. Coincidently, in both instances Confederate Lieutenant S. Smith
Lee was the first to board each one of Clark’s vessels. Lieutenant Lee thought of this second
meeting as “an excellent joke,” but Clark failed to see the humor.102 No whaling captain wanted
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to be like Nye or Clark. It was bad enough suffering one destructive encounter with a
Confederate cruiser, never mind a second.
As Captain Clark surrendered a second ship to the Confederates, the crew of the
Shenandoah spotted five more whalers in the distance. Waddell and his crew were able to
capture three out of the five vessels, and all three, the Gypsy, Isabella, and General Pike were
New Bedford whalers. Now with nearly two hundred and twenty-two prisoners in his custody,
Waddell bonded the General Pike for $45,000 and sent his prisoners on their way to San
Francisco.103 In six months, the Shenandoah captured twelve New Bedford whalers, nine of
which the Shenandoah captured within the last three weeks of the cruise. This was a devastating
blow to a city which had already lost nearly three dozen vessels since the beginning of the war.
Yet, the most destructive single day was yet to come.
Early on the morning of June 28, Waddell spotted eleven whaleships in the distance.
First, the Shenandoah captured the New Bedford whaler Waverly and burned it. Then, a little
after noon, the Shenandoah approached the other ten vessels. Nine vessels gathered around the
Brunswick of New Bedford which had recently collided with an iceberg. The masters and crew
of all ten vessels were in the process of auctioning off the materials, tools, and supplies on the
Brunswick when the Shenandoah sailed up. In an amazing example of stealth and coordination,
the crew of the Shenandoah utilized their five longboats and the threat from their artillery pieces
to secure the surrender of nine of the ten vessels. Six of these vessels were from New Bedford,
the ships James Murray, Isaac Howland, and Nassau, and the barks Congress, Hillman, and
Martha.104
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The one hold out was the Favorite of Fairhaven, Massachusetts. As Captain Young made
his fruitless stand, the effect of these captures settled in upon the whalers. This fateful day, June
28, 1865, was the single most destructive day in New Bedford’s whaling history. Out of the
eleven total ships captured, seven were from New Bedford. The Shenandoah burned $340,563 of
outfits and vessels, and bonded one vessel for $37,000. Although the total price tag for the
whalers of New Bedford for this one day was over $370,000, the bonded vessel’s worth was
never paid. The $340,563 in destructed materials was more value in whaleships than the
Alabama destroyed in its entire cruise.105 This was the final laurel the Confederate steamer added
to its logs, as Waddell, fearing that the war was over, decided to return to England. The
Shenandoah’s days of commerce raiding were over.
The Shenandoah’s most destructive days occurred after the Confederacy no longer
existed, and Northern merchants were astounded by the sheer destruction. In total, the
Shenandoah captured thirty-eight ships, destroyed thirty-four of them, and bonded the other four.
Of these thirty-eight, twenty-five were whaleships, and of this number, twenty-one were from
New Bedford. The cruiser destroyed well over $1.1 million worth of value, and $752,692 of this
was destroyed New Bedford whalers.106 The actions of the Shenandoah diminished New
Bedford’s whaling capacity by nearly twenty percent. The Republican Standard bemoaned the
navy’s failure to protect the industry, complaining “It seems that there has been gross negligence
on the part of the government, in leaving so important of a branch of national industry and so
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much property without adequate protection.”107 Undoubtedly, many of the city’s inhabitants
shared these sentiments, condemning the federal government for its inaction. But no matter how
much they accused the government of negligence, it was too late. The damage was done.
The war years proved extremely destructive. In all, fifty-seven vessels were destroyed
between 1861 and 1865. Of these, Confederate commerce raiders captured thirty-one of these
costing New Bedford owners and agents approximately $1,025,231. These numbers fail to
calculate the number of vessels that remained idle in port during the war years. Many merchants,
fearing the worst, kept their vessels in port, unwilling to pay war premiums and risk their vessels.
This meant that the number of vessels returning to port dropped as low as forty by 1866. This cut
into the profits of many agents and owners. The fewer trips, the less whale oil they produced and
the less money they made. The war also forced some whalers into less lucrative grounds like the
Caribbean. With more vessels going to less productive grounds, the potential for profit decreased
as well.
Yet, even with the fleet’s sized diminished as much as thirty percent or higher, the war
did have positive impacts. Prices rose because of a diminished supply of stores combined with
reduced capacity, which steadied the downward trend of prices begun in the 1850s. With prices
rising, the potential for profit increased. Although increased insurance rates did counterbalance
the increased prices of whale oil to a certain extent, many owners lucky enough to survive the
war enjoyed larger profits. For many in New Bedford, there was still hope.
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CHAPTER 4. “A FORTUITOUS STEP:” INSURANCE AND RECOVERING LOSS

With an ocean and an entire continent separating the burning remnants of the Arctic
whaling fleet and New Bedford, bonded vessels like the General Pike and James Maury sailed
for San Francisco. These vessels were packed with the nearly 300 prisoners the Shenandoah
captured its last six days at sea. These ships, laden with men not oil, lethargically moved towards
the west coast with sad tidings. Over a month elapsed before they arrived in San Francisco. The
news traveled across the telegraph lines and by late August and September 1865, newspaper
headlines in major Northern cities proclaimed “The Late Destruction of Whalers,” “The Man
who Defied Waddell the Pirate,” and “Wholesale Piracy.”108 This news stunned the Northeast.
Lulled into a false sense of security with the war’s supposed end that April, New Bedford owners
did not imagine this type of destruction possible.
New Bedford residents criticized Waddell for his actions. One particular article in the
Whalemen’s Shipping List accused that “the pirate ship [Shenandoah] was advised of the
surrender of Lee and the murder of the President… But the captain doubted the first… and went
on about his devilish work.”109 These criticisms were for naught. The deeds could not be undone.
Should Waddell have returned to the United States, he may have been tried for piracy, and would
have likely been the second Confederate officer to be executed by the government. Waddell
wisely did not return to the U. S. until 1870. As shocked, angry, and disillusioned as this news
might have left New Bedford’s whalers, there was cause for hope. Insurance allowed owners to
retrieve lost capital.
Waddell, CSS Shenandoah, 175; Whalemen’s Shipping List, 8/22/1865, 8/24/1865,
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Marine insurance was an important part of New Bedford’s economy. The approximately
320 ships that called it home in the 1850s faced a lot of risk. In fact, whaling was one of the
riskiest investments of the time. Subjected to harsh weather, treacherous seas, rogue whales, and
bad luck, whaling voyages failed for any number of reasons. Not only did owners accept the risk
of natural disasters, they also accepted the risk of human error. Whaling was a form of fishing,
and no fishing trip was guaranteed to be successful. A good captain experiencing bad luck could
take a profitable thirty month voyage and turn it into a six or seven year debacle. Despite these
potential pitfalls, the chance for profit was simply too attractive. Seeking to mitigate some of this
risk, whaleship owners purchased insurance.
A marine insurance contract involved an insurer or “underwriter,” assuming the entire
risk or part of the risk on either the vessel, cargo, or both, in exchange for a premium from the
vessel’s owner. The underwriter determined the premiums based upon the estimated probability
of a ship and cargo being damaged or destroyed. Numerous risk factors included “The route, and
the season, the age and seaworthiness of the ship, and the quality of its crew and armament, as
well as, in wartime, the danger of capture by enemy naval vessels.” All of these factors dictated
the risk the underwriter assumed and at what price the insurance company was willing to do so.
Underwriters were often less informed than their clients. One underwriter quoted in John
Weskett’s law study of insurance complained “With the keenest penetration and judgement, it
will rarely happen that [the underwriter] is on an equal footing, as he ought to be with the
insured.” Add to this the excessive cases of fraud in the early nineteenth century, and marine
underwriters demanded increasingly higher premiums throughout this period.110
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Whaling only complicated these conditions. The nature of whaling was different from
other maritime industries. As Captain Semmes realized, forced by the nature of the animal they
killed, whalers congregated in the same regions at certain times of year.111 Not only did that
make them susceptible to prowling privateers, but it also made them susceptible to the elements.
One major storm could potentially destroy a large part of the fleet, or ice moving in from the
Arctic faster than anticipated could trap large numbers of vessels, something that happened in
1871.
Swift and Allen was a prominent agent firm in New Bedford. Established in 1842 by
Frederick S. Allen (1812-1896) and his brother-in-law, Jireh Swift (1809-1905), their firm acted
as the agents for twenty whaleships from 1844 to 1887.112 One of the vessels owned and
operated by the firm was the Jireh Swift, the namesake of one of its owners. With eight investors,
the Jireh Swift serves as a superb example of how insurance was handled with a whaleship with
multiple owning partners.
The largest shareholder in the vessel was Swift and Allen. The firm owned thirty-nine
percent of the vessel and its outfits in addition to overseeing the general operations of the vessel.
The largest individual shareholder was a “Mr. Crocker” owning fourteen percent of the vessel.
Two individual shareholders owned eleven percent each, and three others each owned seven
percent. A woman, Nancy Billings, owned seven percent of the ship. Finally, a man named
William Russel, a descendant of Joseph Russel who sold the first tract of land to the Rotch

University Press, 2007), 380-381; John Weskett, A Complete Digest of the Theory, Laws, and
Practice of Insurance (London: Couchman and Collier, 1781), 297.
111

Semmes, Service Afloat, 431-2.

112

Whaling Museum manuscript for collection of Swift and Allen.
60

family of Nantucket, owned four percent of the vessel and its outfits.113 Russel, a prominent
member of the community and shareholder in the Jireh Swift, serves as a case study on the
importance of joint ownership and insurance during the war years.
In 1861, Russel held investments in nearly a dozen whaleships at typically seven percent.
The four percent held in the Jireh Swift was one of the smallest shares he had. With hundreds of
dollars invested, Russel needed insurance to protect his investments.114 Instead of purchasing
policies on his own, he relied upon the agents he dealt with as the middle-men between the
insurance company and himself.
Swift and Allen purchased an insurance policy for $13,500 from the Mutual Marine
Insurance Company in 1863 for the Jireh Swift. This price covered the ship and its outfits when
the vessel departed port. Russel, as a four percent shareholder invested $540 in the ship. The
Mutual Marine Insurance Company offered a 5.8% premium rate. Hypothetically, if Russel
purchased this insurance policy for himself for his share of the vessel, he would have paid $31.32
in premiums.115 After procuring this policy, he then would have secured separate policies for
each one of the vessels he owned. Russel would have undertaken the extremely tedious task of
shopping around different insurance companies for the best rates. Potentially he could have held
twelve separate policies with twelve separate companies.
Agents, like Swift and Allen identified this problem and solved it by purchasing
insurance effectively in bulk. Agents took out a policy on the entire vessel, fronting the premium
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for the owners. Swift and Allen purchased a policy at 5.8% with the Mutual Marine Insurance
Company for $783. With the insurance covering the entire vessel and its outfits, Swift and Allen
then collected a percentage of the premium payment they made from each shareholder in
accordance with their percent ownership. Russel paid $31.32 to cover his four percent ownership
in the vessel.116 Although this price equaled the cost of Russel purchasing his own policy, this
manner of doing business saved Russel a lot of work. Swift and Allen sought out the best deal
and negotiated with the insurance company. Russel just paid the money. This time saving
advantage made this process common practice. For investors like Russel, it was much easier to
allow agents to handle insurance policies.
Of the fifty-one insurance policies Swift and Allen held during the war years, forty-nine
of them were purchased by Swift and Allen upfront, with owners paying their percentage to the
firm at a later date. Some examples exist including a policy taken out on the ship George
Washington, where one of the owning members, William Statt, took out his own policy with the
Union Mutual Marine Insurance Company. This was not the typical practice, though. Having an
agent purchase insurance for the entire ownership group was a much more efficient manner of
handling insurance.
Agents also purchased policies for their shareholder on the product a vessel caught. With
risk at an all-time high in 1864, with the Alabama prowling the oceans, Swift and Allen
purchased a policy on the “Catchings” aboard the Jireh Swift. After receiving a letter from the
captain of the Jireh Swift, Swift and Allen purchased a policy with the Pacific Mutual Insurance
Company. In his letter, the captain estimated the total value of oil onboard to be $5,000. At a
four percent rate, Swift and Allen covered the product. Russel gave $8.04 which effectively
“Statement of Premiums Paid by Swift and Allen to Cover War Risks,” Swift and
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insured that even if the Confederates destroyed the ship, he would earn his $200 of income from
the product onboard regardless of whether or not the vessel returned.117 By purchasing this
policy, Swift and Allen and the members of the ownership group, like Russel, protected
themselves against the possibility their vessel would be destroyed. This practice proved prudent
for many owners. Russel and his fellow owners received word in 1865 that the Shenandoah
captured and destroyed the Jireh Swift.118 Insurance policies like these protected owners from
this loss.
Crew members also purchased insurance on the catch. These men were very interested in
the product they caught because of the payment system utilized by whaling agents. The “lay
system” of pay meant each crew member shared in the profit of the voyage based upon his rank
and duty. Men who occupied the higher ranks received the highest percent of the crew’s share
while the average sailor received a smaller percentage. Because their earnings depended on the
amount of product they caught, every crew member had a vested interest in that product. Should
the catch be lost, so was their pay. As a result, the 1850s and 1860s saw an increasing number of
crew members taking out insurance on the vessel’s catch. This increased considerably during the
war years. For example, the crew of the Jireh Swift paid fifty-six dollars collectively to insure
their twenty-eight percent of the value of the catch. Should the whale oil and bone on the Jireh
Swift be lost, the crew would split a $1,377 payment from the Pacific Mutual Company.119
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This decision was certainly made among the ranking members of the crew. Captain
Thomas Wilson, his mates and higher ranking hands like his harpooners would have been the
only ones onboard who could have afforded the premium for the policy. It is unlikely that a
greenhand like Samuel Bancker, a nineteen year old from New York City, would have had the
money or the fiscal savy to pay for his share of the policy. It is possible a ranking member could
have leant him the money for this purpose, but there exists no evidence to indicate either way.
The captain and his mates had the most to lose if the product was destroyed, and that was why
they wanted the product insured. The first mate, Crayton Holcomb would have lost a payment of
nearly $200 should the whale oil aboard be destroyed. Likewise, the third mate, Joseph Smith,
would have lost $175.120 With so much potential money invested, many crew members felt it
was necessary to purchase insurance.
Out of nine vessels put to sea by Swift and Allen from 1861 to 1865, six had the crew
members purchase insurance on the product on board. The three exceptions were vessels that
returned early in the war or left after the war had officially ended. One of the vessels that had the
crew buy insurance even had specific crew members listed as buying their own policies separate
from the rest of the crew. The 1864 insurance policy from the Sun Mutual Insurance Company of
New York recorded the third mate and two boatsteerers as having singular policies on their lay.
Since commerce raiders destroyed the whaleship and its product on spot by burning it, these
laborers paid for the safety net that protected their work. Perhaps unwilling to split the insurance
payment with the rest of the crew, third mate David Mcfale on the whaling bark Fanny, paid $51
that insured his $1,866 payment on his share of the catch. The premium he paid, more than an
infantry soldier made in three months during the Civil War, would have been well worth it
120
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should the Fanny have been captured.121 But the Fanny was never captured. Although Mcfale
still made his share at the end of the voyage, the unused insurance was an important safety net.
Although exhaustive records do not exist, findings in I. H. Bartlett and Son’s records
support the finding from Swift and Allen. The frequency of crew members purchasing insurance
in both sets of records indicates this practice was commonplace during the war years. Out of a
total eighteen vessels that the two agent firms insured for “the catchings,” fourteen of them or
seventy-eight percent have the crew listed as paying premiums on their share. Records from the
Alabama Claims also seem to justify this assertion.122 Certainly not every crew on every ship did
this, but it seems as though a fair number of crews on whaling vessels took advantage of
insurance as a way of protecting their potential profit.
During the war, insurance companies forced both owners and crew members to pay
higher premiums. With risk increasing, underwriters instituted war premiums. A war premium
was a special rate which mitigated the increased risks during war. These premiums, charged in
addition to the standard premium, meant that the average insured party paid an additional two to
seven percent on insurance. When added to the standard premium of three to five percent, this
additional charge meant the total payment for insurance could be anywhere from seven to twelve
percent. Merchant vessels insured by the Pacific Mutual Insurance Company saw war premiums
as diverse as 1.3% for the ship George Washington in 1861, to 7% on the bark Ospray and its
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outfits in 1863.123 These divergent rates had two causes. One was the destination of the
whaleship. Insurers charged a higher premium for vessels headed for or through waters where
Confederate commerce raiders were known to be. Underwriters felt safe insuring the George
Washington at such a low rate because it was destined for the Pacific in 1861. No known
Confederate vessels operated in the Pacific at that time so insurers felt comfortable offering a
low war premium. The second factor that effected war premiums was the context in which the
insurance was purchased. When the Ospray’s owners bought insurance in 1863, the CSS
Alabama was in the midst of its destructive cruise. Given the danger posed by the Alabama,
insurers wanted a higher premium to offset the higher risk. To further complicate matters, the
Ospray headed first for the Azores, the place where the Alabama captured a half dozen whalers
the previous year. Because of both the destination of the vessel and the Confederate raider’s
activity the owners of the Ospray were charged an extremely high war premium.
Even though underwriters attempted to adjust for higher risks, the insured still held a
distinct advantage. Although underwriters felt safe offering lower war premiums to vessels
destined for the North Pacific, the insurers had mispriced the risk. The Martha, owned by Swift
and Allen, departed New Bedford in 1863 for a two plus year cruise in the Arctic where they
hunted the bowhead whale. Thinking the Martha safe from Confederates in the Arctic Ocean,
insurers at the Union Mutual Marine Insurance Company offered the owners a four percent war
premium. Lack of knowledge played to the advantage of the Martha’s owners. Although it is
certain neither the insurers nor the insured ever imagined the Shenandoah would arrive in the
Arctic in 1865, this was exactly what happened. This unknown factor of what the Confederate
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Bedford Whaling Museum, Box 10 Folder 8.
123

66

naval plan was adversely affected the insurance agency when they paid a policy worth $11,250
to Swift and Allen after the Shenandoah captured and destroyed the whaleship.124 Underwriters
had not priced the dangers that the Confederates posed to the Pacific whaling fleet.
As underwriters anticipated the best they could, owners decided that the most prudent
thing to do was to purchase insurance. An example of how this looked in practice was a policy
Mathew Howland purchased from the Pacific Mutual Insurance Company. Bought on November
24, 1863 at the height of the Alabama’s destructive cruise, policy 4202 insured the whaling
vessel Golconda. Howland was the primary owner of this vessel. He paid a $2,000 premium
which provided seven months of coverage. A clerk recorded his rate as “Nine (9) per cent
Annum. Five (5) for Marine Risks, and Four (4) for the War Risk.”125 What would have been a
five percent rate before the war became a nine percent rate because of the war premiums. This
additional four percent was a hardship for owners, but most realized it was necessary.
Underwriters were certainly at a disadvantage but so were those insured by them. Increased
overhead cut into Howland’s and other owner’s profits, and it kept some from the industry until
the war ended. War risks caused a hardship for all involved, but at least for owners like
Howland, this inconvenience paid off if their whaleship was captured.
The Shenandoah captured two of Swift and Allen’s vessels in the Bering Sea in 1865: the
Jireh Swift and the Martha. 126 The Jireh Swift at its time of capture had been at sea for nearly
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I will use these two vessels as a case study of what happened with insurance policies
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result, they serve as the best known examples of this process. Although these two cases certainly
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three years. Leaving New Bedford in 1862, the Swift had great success in the early years of the
voyage. In fact, the Swift had been so productive the captain sent a shipment of whale bone and
oil home in 1864. This practice was common if a trip was especially productive. This $62,125 of
product safely arrived in New Bedford later that year. In addition, when the vessel was captured,
the crew had approximately $35,000 of oil and bone onboard. The owners secured a policy in
1862 which covered the ship and outfits at approximately $13,500 of value for a three year term.
A few weeks prior to its capture, the crew and owners insured $35,000 worth of product onboard
making the total insured value $48,500. The Official Records of the Union and Confederate
Navies listed the approximate value of the ship and its catchings at $61,960 at the time of its
capture.127 This meant only $13,460 of product was not insured.128
When news arrived of the Jireh Swift’s destruction in late 1865, Swift and Allen
submitted their insurance claims. By the following year, the China Mutual Insurance Company,
the Atlantic Ocean Mutual Insurance Company, and the Pacific Mutual Insurance Company
made payments totaling $48,500. Records exist which confirm a payment was made to the crew
members by the Pacific Mutual Insurance Company for their policy on the catchings on the

do not speak for all instances, they do provide evidence of what the typical scenario might have
gone.
127

The government determined this number from the reports of both Confederate officers
aboard the Shenandoah and the later claims of the whalers after the war. Although this number
seems slightly inflated, there is no reason to believe this number is not reasonably accurate.
“Memo War Premiums Paid by Swift and Allen,” Swift and Allen Collection, New
Bedford Whaling Museum, Box 10, Folder 13; Official Records of Union and Confederate
Navies, V.3, 792.
128

68

vessel, but it cannot be confirmed whether or not each individual member actually received their
payment. All the owning members recouped all of their invested capital.129
Not only did the owners reap the benefits of the $62,125 earned on the product shipped
back to New Bedford earlier in 1865, but they also received insurance payments for $35,000 of
product onboard at the time of capture. The only loss they experienced was the additional
$13,460 of additional product that was not yet insured.130 This significant loss should not be
overlooked, but when one considers the owners had already profited off of this voyage from the
shipments made earlier in the voyage and insurance, the loss was certainly bearable for them. No
longer with a whaleship and its outfits, they could invest their money in anything they wanted. In
a way, they were freed of this particular investments in the whaling industry. This would be an
important factor in the increasing investments in industrial mills in New Bedford. The crew
profited off the product shipped to New Bedford earlier in the cruise and from payments made by
the insurance companies. Being captured by a Confederate commerce raider was unfortunate for
whalers, but it also would produce great profit for many of those in the industry.
Unlike the Jireh Swift, the bark Martha was not so lucky. Suffering from their inability to
find the great leviathan, the Martha was off to a slow start. It left New Bedford in late 1863 and
arrived at the Pacific whaling grounds by the New Year in the hopes of turning their luck around.
At the time of capture eighteen months later, the Martha only had about $11,900 of product on
board. The captain and crew did not purchase insurance on this because they felt it was not
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enough to justify the premium. They regretted this decision when the Shenandoah captured and
burned the ship on June 28, 1865.131 The crew members lost everything they had worked for.
Their hard work, enduring the rough seas and beastly whales, saw them returning home with no
money for their time and no insurance as a safety net.
The owners, like the crew, lost out on any potential for profit on this voyage, but they
were at least able to recoup the money that they had spent outfitting the ship. The ownership
group of the Martha, Jireh Swift and Frederick Allen, was much smaller than the Jireh Swift’s.
In 1865, Swift and Allen purchased a policy from the Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company for
$18,700 which covered the value of the ship and its outfits.132 As a result, Swift and Allen
recovered the capital invested in the Martha.
Both the owners of the Jireh Swift and Martha mitigated the destruction of their property,
but with insurance payments, the money they now had was not tied to any physical assets. From
the numerous examples of the individuals purchasing insurance it seems as though many in New
Bedford resigned to the fact that their whaleship would be captured. Expecting the worse, they
insured their assets so that way they would not lose their money. This mentality and the abundant
examples of insurance policies demonstrate how the individuals stayed the destructiveness of
their enemy, and in some cases, like that of the Jireh Swift, profited. Insurance saved many
owners and crew from what could have been one of the darkest moments in whaling history.
With the money acquired from insurance whalers took two divergent paths. Some like
David Kempton reinvested in the whaling industry. In late 1865, Kempton refitted the Leonidas
Whalemen’s Shipping List, 8/22/1865; Official Records of Union and Confederate
Navies, V3, 792.
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with money from insurance payments. Within a month of its arrival in port, the whaleship was
back out to sea. This almost unprecedented turnaround was courtesy of insurance payments
Kempton received from the destruction of the Golconda by the Confederate cruiser Florida.
Other owners, like Mathew Howland, invested insurance payments in the textile industry.
In late 1865, Howland invested in several shares of ownership in the Wamsutta Mill. Although
the Wamsutta Mill remained the only textile mill in New Bedford until 1871, incidents like the
Civil War and the later Arctic disasters of the 1870s left many whaling owners reluctant to
reinvest in whaling. This led many to overcome what National Park historians Christine Arato
and Patrick Eleey observed as “their initial reluctance to invest in textile production, [and they]
took the fortuitous step that allowed them to continue to dominate local finance and
commerce.”133 The destruction of so many vessels during the war pushed many to take this
“fortuitous” step towards industrializing New Bedford.
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CHAPTER 5. “WHAT IS THE AMOUNT DUE:” THE ALABAMA CLAIMS

The war years proved difficult for Benjamin Tucker. Tucker, a whaling tycoon, owned
shares in a half dozen vessels, two of which Confederates captured during the war. The CSS
Alabama destroyed his namesake ship, the Benjamin Tucker in 1862, and the Shenandoah
captured and bonded the General Pike. Three additional vessels that he owned shares in
remained in port for the entirety of the war. The only vessel Tucker owned which produced
income during the war was the Massachusetts. Although the Massachusetts offloaded $23,111 of
product in October 1864, exorbitant insurance prices cut into Tucker’s profit. This is not to say
the war financially destroyed Tucker because it did not. Insurance paid back the loss of the
Benjamin Tucker and the product onboard, and since Waddell bonded the General Pike, that
vessel was spared from destruction. Rather than a hardship, insurance saved Tucker from major
financial loss.134
But there was the principle of the matter as well. Had the British government prohibited
British shipyards from outfitting or in some cases building the pesky Confederate commerce
raiders, he would not have had to pay a war premium. He would have probably still had his
namesake ship too. Tucker believed the British government culpable for his loss. He certainly
agreed with United States Minister to Great Britain, Reverdy Johnson’s assessment that the
“Alabama outrages might have been prevented by one or two courses- either by your government
not having recognized belligerency as belonging to the insurgents of the United States, or by
observing proper diligence in preventing such vessels…from getting to sea.”135
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Many individuals in Northeastern coastal ports agreed with Tucker’s assessment and
resentment festered among these people. The British government’s claim of neutrality during the
war was hard to square with the fact that the British outfitted five Confederate commerce raiders.
The war destroyed more whaling vessels than any other event in New Bedford’s history, and the
Alabama and the Shenandoah were especially destructive. Many Northern mariners, like
Benjamin Tucker, believed that the British government should be liable for the actions of these
Confederate commerce raiders.136
To alleviate this tension with Britain, the U. S. Department of State began negotiations to
settle their differences. In the midst of political crisis and an impending loss in the 1868
presidential election, President Andrew Johnson, perhaps as a last ditch hope to secure the
support of the Northern merchant marine directed the United States Minister to Great Britain,
Reverdy Johnson, to begin negotiations for a settlement.137 Reverdy Johnson, was noted for his
work as the defense attorney of such notorious figures as John Sanford, in the Dred Scott case
and Mary Surrat, the supposed conspirator in the Lincoln Assassination. Born in Annapolis,
Maryland, Johnson remained with the Union, serving as a U.S. Senator from 1863 to 1868
representing his home state. Known for his opposition to President Lincoln and the war effort, he
quickly earned a reputation as a copperhead. President Andrew Johnson appointed him as the
Minister to Great Britain in September 1868, succeeding the noted diplomat, Charles Francis
Adams.138
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President Johnson ordered Minister Johnson to secure a treaty that would resolve the
growing tensions in the North. Johnson worked closely with Frederick Lord Stanley, the Civil
Lord of the Admiralty and later the namesake of the National Hockey League’s Stanley Cup.
They reached an agreement known as the Johnson-Clarendon Treaty. This treaty, signed in
January 1869, stated claims against Great Britain would be settled by a panel of four
representatives: two from the United States and two from Great Britain. If a tie resulted, a fifth,
neutral “umpire” agreed upon by all four members would pass a final verdict. These men would
decide whether or not claims were valid. Once validity was discerned, settlements would be
negotiated among the panel members.139 Minister Johnson thought the treaty a great triumph,
promoting “peace between the two nations, remov[ing] a cause which has disturbed us… to the
verge of hostility.”140
Not everyone looked upon the treaty so optimistically. Murmurs of discontent spread
across the Northeast almost from the instant news of the treaty arrived in the country. The fact
these men would decide the validity of individual cases was absurd to many mariners. They
thought the British guilty beyond a doubt and the only thing that should be negotiated was a
price. To try claims on an individual case would be too time consuming and might not work out
for all those submitting claims. A January 29, 1869 article in the New Bedford Mercury’s
editorial asserted “What the men, whose ships were burned by the British pirate, demand and our
government should not abate one jot of the demand, is that the English government shall admit in
plain Saxon, that property destroyed by the Alabama is to be paid for, leaving as sole question to

139

New Bedford Mercury, 1/29/1869.

140

New Bedford Mercury, 3/12/1869.
74

be ascertained by the commission, what is the amount due.”141 Mariners insisted that this was the
only acceptable course. No international committee should decide the validity of claims. That
was self-evident. Uproar from the North was great enough that the Senate rejected the treaty and
newly elected President Ulysses S. Grant recalled Minister Johnson. President Grant appointed
John Lothrop Motley as the new minister to Great Britain in June 1869. Motley proved
completely inept at procuring a settlement between the two nations during his tenure. Blatantly
ignoring Secretary of State Hamilton Fish’s directives, Motley forced Grant to remove him from
his post on December 6, 1870. New Bedford’s whaleship owners were no closer to a settlement
than they had been five year early at the end of the war.142 It was Motley’s counterpart, Sir
Edward Thornton, the British Ambassador to the United States who proposed the final
resolution. He suggested both nations appoint high commissioners who would negotiate a
settlement. The commission, composed of twelve appointees (6 from the United States and 6
from Great Britain) met in Washington D.C. and ultimately arbitrated an agreement.143
The U. S. commissioners indicated five categorical ways that the British government
should be held monetarily accountable for the effects of the five Confederate commerce raiders
which were British-built vessels. Two of these categories were important for New Bedford’s
whalers, including “Claims for private losses growing out of the destruction of vessels and their
cargoes” and “The enhanced payments of insurance by private persons.” The U. S.
commissioners also stipulated a separate tribunal, composed of five representatives should meet
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at Geneva, Switzerland to decide on the monetary award to be paid. On May 8, 1871, the Treaty
of Washington was signed and was quickly ratified shortly after by both nations.144
Meeting in Geneva in 1872, the tribunal composed of Charles Francis Adams and
Attorney General Maxwell Evarts of the United States, Sir Alexander Cockburn of Great Britain,
and three neutral members from Italy, Switzerland, and Brazil, awarded the United States
$15,500,000. These payments were made in a series from March 31, 1877 to June 2, 1886. The
British government ultimately paid a total of $16,292,607.26. The additional $790,000 from the
original settlement was ordered to be paid by the tribunal from accumulated interest which
included four percent per annum of interest for every year since the Confederate’s destroyed
their property. Nearly ten years had passed since Appomattox, and most claimants received an
average of forty percent in addition to the filed amount.145
As the State Department began receiving money from Great Britain, the Department
devised a plan to expeditiously get the money to those who were entitled to it. The Department
delegated local lawyers in major Northern ports most affected by commerce raiding. These
lawyers often had already petitioned the government for redress on behalf of their clients. In
New Bedford, the State Department selected the prominent firm of Clifford, Clifford, and Crapo
as their representatives and Charles Clifford, Ashley Clifford, and William Crapo all received
official documents deputizing them as “Commissioners” of the court. The Department directed
them “to take testimony of such witnesses as may come before you, to be used in the
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investigation of any claim or claims which may be presented to this Court.”146 With this
directive, Clifford, Clifford, and Crapo collected claims from those in the surrounding
community. By far the most vociferous group that answered the call was the former whaleship
owners as they had lost the most during the war.
Former owners, like Benjamin Tucker, petitioned under the first category indicated in the
Treaty of Washington which dictated claims could be filed for private losses resulting from the
destruction of vessels. On form legal documents the law office received from the State
Department, former owners recorded their vital records, ownership records, and disposition of
their vessel. Hannah P. Paine filed a claim for her fractional ownership in the whaleship Nassau,
which the Shenandoah destroyed. 147 Hannah Paine owned 1/8 of the vessel at its times of
destruction. The clerk in Clifford, Clifford, and Crapo’s office recorded her vital records and a
list of her fellow shareholders. This was followed by Paine’s claims. These included:
For loss of 4/32 of ship Nassau - / whole value/ $3,750
For loss of 4/32 of her [the Nassau’s] outfits - /whole value/ $6,250
For loss of 4/32 of 100 bbls. whale oil at $1.31 per gal. - $4,126.50
For loss of 4/32 of 2,400 lbs. of whalebone at $1.63 per lb. = $3,993.50
For loss of 4/32 of 1,500 lbs. of ivory at $0.80 = $1,200
Then the clerk calculated the total value of all Paine’s holding at $11,165.148 Paine’s fellow
shareholders made similar claims. William Swift, half owner of the vessel submitted a claim for
$89,320. This included the $15,000 of value in the vessel and the $50,000 of the outfits he
owned. Recouping the lost value of the ship and its outfits was not enough though. These owners
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also wanted reimbursement for the value of catch on board. This money, the source of profit for
their voyages, ensured these owners would not just break even. It is worth noting that Ms. Paine
and Mr. Swift, like many of their cohorts, already received insurance payments for these items
they claimed. The shareholders of forty separate vessels followed suit, submitting similar claims
to the ones Paine and Swift made.149
The case of the General Pike is a unique example of a claim where an owner really
profited. Although it was captured by the Shenandoah in June 1865, Waddell decided not to burn
the vessel. Instead he bonded the General Pike. For owners like Benjamin Tucker this meant
they did not lose their vessel. Although Waddell bonded the ship at $45,000, payable to the
Confederate government, the owners saw no need to pay the bond to a Confederate government
that no longer existed, and besides, New Bedford owners would not pay those “rebel pirates a
single penny.” As the General Pike sailed for New Bedford, news arrived from San Francisco of
the destructive Arctic cruise of the Shenandoah. Tucker and the other owners of the General
Pike submitted claims and received insurance payments on the product destroyed by the
Confederates. Tucker also included the losses of cargo aboard the General Pike when he filed for
the Alabama Claims. When payment came for lost product, this was the second time someone
paid Tucker for that same product. He doubled the value of the original product lost through
insurance payments and the Alabama Claims.
Not everyone related to the General Pike was as lucky as Tucker. After bonding the
vessel, Waddell awarded the master of the General Pike, Hebron Cromwell, with a gift of two
hundred and twenty-two prisoners. Forced to care for these new additions to his crew, most of
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the Pike’s stores diminished at Cromwell’s expense. The owners, Tucker included, refused to
help the captain pay for this expense claiming that it was not their responsibility. No insurance
policy covered food or munitions used by the crew, and as a result, Captain Cromwell paid for it
with his own money. Although his ship was saved the fate of destruction, he was rewarded with
having to feed and keep alive over two hundred men.
In a statement sent to Clifford, Clifford, and Crapo, Cromwell recorded the prodigious
amounts of food stuffs consumed. Included was fifty-three barrels of beef, nineteen barrels of
pork “copious” amounts of ships bread, ten barrels of flour, one hundred sixty pounds of coffee,
and one hundred ninety pounds of sugar, and unknown quantities of “preserved meats and small
stores.” In addition to the food he lost, he also lost equipment. The perpetrator of the stolen
equipment could have been either greedy, captured whalers or the Confederates, but the gear was
gone when they arrived in San Francisco. This included forty casks of whale oil probably
“thrown overboard,” coopers and carpenters tools, cutting tools, cordage and lines, and one
unusual item, a pair of opera glasses. Cromwell concluded his note with an interesting mix of
affidavit and disclaimer writing “The above statement is correct according to my best
recollection.”150 Of course Clifford, Clifford, and Crapo must forgive him if his recollection was
imperfect given nearly five years had passed.
Cromwell’s situation was unique. Unlike most other claimants, Waddell spared the
General Pike. Cromwell did lose product and parts of his outfits which he wisely included in his
list of hardships but the majority of his claims were food stuffs. Cromwell viewed this as an
undue hardship directly caused by the Shenandoah’s actions and his owner’s inaction. Lumped
in with all the other claims, the court awarded Cromwell compensation equaling the wartime
“Statement of M. Cromwell, Master of the Ship General Pike,” Clifford, Clifford, and
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150

79

value of the food and materials expended.151 This unique example demonstrates how Clifford,
Clifford, and Crapo expanded the definition of “wartime hardships” to mean a wide range of
things that included more than just lost whale product and destroyed ships.
Many captains also put in individual claims for lost possessions. They wanted reparations
for their personal property that was either stolen or burned after a Confederate commerce raider
captured them. These men felt wronged and violated. Captain Charles Worth, master of the
whaleship Edward of New Bedford, summed up the feelings of many of his colleagues after
being captured the best. In a cramped room in the U.S. Consulate at Cape Town in December
1864, Worth penned a disheartened letter. Writing of his condition after capture by the
Shenandoah, he waxed “We are robbed of everything we possessed but our clothing and part of
that was stolen on board the Shenandoah… My officers, crew, and myself, are dependent on the
U. S. Consul at this place [Cape Town], not one of us left with a dollar.”152 According to Worth
the Shenandoah stole everything from them, save the clothes off of their own backs. This left
Worth and his crew entirely dependent upon the government for a time until they could be
returned to the U.S. This capture made them paupers, paupers who had to wait months to return
home. Other captains shared Worth’s despondence after capture. They were robbed of everything
they had. Confederates mugged them, and they did not forget the possessions taken from them,
possessions that insurance would not pay for.
Captains Samuel Green and Benjamin Winslow felt as Worth did. When the opportunity
for redress presented itself with the Alabama Claims these two were among the first to submit
information for lost goods. Sam Green was the captain of the Nassau when the Shenandoah
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captured and destroyed it in 1865. His clothes, nautical instruments and charts, and cash in the
form of gold and silver were all either stolen or destroyed by the Confederates. His share of
whale bone valued at $400 was lost as well. He also paid $25 for insurance on his portion of the
catch on board at the time of capture. Green estimated his total value of items lost or destroyed at
$900. With Clifford, Clifford, and Crapo searching for claims, Green submitted the paperwork
for these losses.153
Similarly, Winslow, the captain of the Golconda, lost all of his possessions onboard. His
clothing, chest, hammock, and a personal collection of “shells and other marine curiosities” were
lost. Winslow was not just the captain of the ship but was also part owners. When he filed a
claim with the law office, he indicated his 1/16 ownership share in the whaleship. He also
included his portion of the 3,156 gallons of oil, 110 barrels of sperm oil, and eight barrels of
black fish oil. He estimated his total losses at $819.154 In 1875, both captains received payments
from the State Department equaling their claims plus forty percent interest. Green and Winslow
received $1,260 and $1,146 respectively. It took ten years but both men received their due. In all,
twelve former captains received payment equaling $18,000. Most of this was for private
possessions such as clothing, but it covered all submitted losses, even in one case, opera
glasses.155
Many former crew members also submitted claims. They all lost things too. Should they
not also be entitled to reimbursement? Shortly after the submission of claims from some of the
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captains, men of all ranks wrote to Clifford, Clifford, and Crapo in the hopes of securing
monetary reimbursement. George W. Briggs, a boatsteerer on Captain Winslow’s Golconda, in a
letter dated January 4, 1875, remarked that he heard about the claims through the papers and
wanted his property accounted for. As an attachment he included a bill of property he possessed
when the Florida captured the vessel. Much like his former captain, he recorded his possessions
as several shirts, trousers, shoes, and a hat. He also included a sea chest and mattress. He listed
fifteen possession totaling $90. This number was significantly less than what his master claimed,
but to individual crew members like Briggs, those items were his and he wanted his $90. That
amount counterbalanced the injustice the Confederates thrust upon him a decade before. Briggs
also fastidiously recorded his current mailing address in Boston so that Clifford knew where to
find him should the law office secure his money.156 Another crew member aboard the Golconda
at the time of capture, Benjamin Wilcox, sought reparations for his lost property too. His list of
possessions included clothing, bedding, two knives, and perhaps the most interesting of his
items, a razor worth $1.25. His total sum was $45. Like Briggs, Wilcox recorded his address. He
lived much closer to the law office, in New Bedford at “No. 4 Bush Street.” They both wanted to
be sure their money was sent to the right place should they win their claim.157
Members of other crews also took up this opportunity. Benjamin Cudworth, second mate
of the Nassau, and John Hallett of the Bark Lacony were also listed among Clifford, Clifford,
and Crapo’s records. Both these men claimed extensive loses, including what appears to have
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been quite the wardrobe for a whaler. Hallet even claimed to have silver and china with him.
Many in New Bedford attacked Raphael Semmes for dressing in fine clothes and being a bit of a
dandy, but as a New Bedford contemporary remarked “The humblest sailor could have put
[Semmes] in the shade, as far as clothes were concerned, if the schedule of the outfits as sworn to
at court were honest.”158 These lavish claims for clothing and other supplies lost, whether
accurate or not, worked. Many individual crew members received full compensation for all their
claims.
Although an exact number of New Bedford sailors who petitioned the court for lost
possessions are not known, there is an irregularity of letters at best. Only about two dozen still
exist, accounting for a wide range of ranks. Everyone from a first mate down to a common
seaman were among the claimants. Yet, this is an extremely small fraction of those crew
members affected by Confederate commerce raiders. Clifford, Clifford, and Crapo did not seek
out individual crew members. They awaited petitions submitted to their firm. These individuals
had full rights to the British reparation payments, but they had to know enough to write the
Cliffords and Crapo. The crew members who had not seen the news in the newspapers or heard
about it from another sailor were unlikely to write. Many former whalers were also spread across
the nation, including a growing population of former whalers in San Francisco.159 These men
would have petitioned local lawyers in their new homes rather Clifford, Clifford, and Crapo.
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Even adjusting for these factors, relatively few crew members submitted claims. But for those
who did, reimbursement came.
Clifford, Clifford, and Crapo’s office was also responsible for acquiring information
about increased insurance payments made resulting from war premiums. Fifteen owners filed
with the office for payment. Some of these individuals held shares in one vessel like Joseph
Taber and George Covell while others like Joseph Brownell and Sylvannus Churchill had shares
in as many as five vessels. These shares ranged in such diverse values as 1/16, 3/16, and 21/64.
The vessels these men owned included both those captured by Confederate commerce raiders
and those only indirectly affected by the war. Some individual owners like Benjamin Tucker
owned shares in both types. Listed under his name was the Benjamin Tucker, captured by the
Alabama, and the Massachusetts, which was untouched during the conflict.160
The increase in war premiums strained whaleship investors. This strain was not the result
of natural circumstances but rather was directly related to the activities of Confederate commerce
raiders which the British government had enabled. The court summated the legal argument for
insurance grievances the best stating “The enhanced rates of insurance in the United States,
occasioned by the Confederate cruisers in question, involving great pecuniary loss to the citizens
of the United States… this injury was actual, and a loss ‘growing out of the acts’ of the
Confederate cruisers by necessary relation of cause and effect, and it followed immediately on
the appearance of these cruisers.”161 Any merchant, regardless of whether or not their vessel was
ever captured were entitled to repayment equaling their expense on war premiums. The unjust
war rates were a direct result of the Confederate commerce raiders, and the commerce raiders
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were a direct result of the British government’s negligence. The court’s ruling held the British
government accountable for the increased insurance prices.
All fifteen of the New Bedford owners who submitted claims for increased insurance
rates received reimbursement from the State Department. They too received the interest equaling
four percent annum. Some of these vessels, like Sylvanus Churchill’s, were never directly
affected by Confederate commerce raiders, but they still received compensation for the insurance
premiums they paid.162
In all, Clifford, Clifford, and Crapo’s work led to members of forty separate whaling
vessels receiving payments totaling $301,759. It was the work of these men and their clerks,
collecting mountains of information, letters, and affidavits, that saw many in New Bedford
prosper from the Alabama Claims. William Crapo, penned numerous letters to the State
Department from 1872 to 1880 advocating for his clients. These letters and the arguments he
made served as the basis of the State Department’s official report on the rulings and awards
issued by the federal government which was printed in 1886.163
This influx of capital came at the propitious time. With industrial mills flourishing in
New Bedford, thanks to the rise of American steam powered mills, this money helped to fund the
construction of new mills. Many wealthy individuals like Matthew Howland, Joseph Grinnell,
and William Russell invested settlements from the Alabama Claims in the further
industrialization of the city. This capital combined with the right economic, technological, and
social conditions in New Bedford brought about a new era in the city’s history.
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CONCLUSION. “THE WHALING BUSINESS…DOOMED TO DESTRUCTION”

As whaling declined through the waning decades of the nineteenth century, industrialism
surged. Matthew Howland recognized this inverse relationship stating in a letter to his son “The
whaling business seems running out and doomed to destruction, so that we may have no business
and no way of earning a dollar.”164 Men like Howland received payments from the State
Department as settlements in the Alabama Claims at the same time as the Wamsutta Mills
realized a three hundred percent profit from its original investments. Howland, already having
invested insurance payments in 1865 towards those mills, needed no further reason why he
should continue to invest in this new industry.165
In a period from 1871 to 1893, coterminous with payments made by the Alabama Claims,
New Bedford owners formed twenty-five new textile mill corporations, each generally
comprised of multiple mill buildings.166 Knowledge that their industry was dying was not enough
to save New Bedford’s whaleship owners. They needed capital that could be invested in a new
industry. The destructiveness of the war and the payments that it produced provided that needed
capital.
With more mills being built, the fleet continued shrinking. By 1874, only twenty vessels
returned to port. This was due in part to the Arctic disasters in 1871 and 1874. Although the
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number of vessels surged to sixty by 1878, the number of vessels returning to port would never
surpass that number again. Whaling was dying, albeit a slow death.167
The American Civil War was far from the sole cause of whaling’s demise. The whaling
industry actually enjoyed the beneficial price increases in products during the war years which
stunted the decline in prices seen during the late 1850s. The war also corrected the issues of
supply and demand experienced by whaling agents before the war. As they produced less
product, they sold off their stores of oil. This corrected the imbalance caused by the massive fleet
before the war.168
The fleet’s size was also reduced by the war. The Stone Fleet and Confederate commerce
raiders each shrunk the fleet by about twenty percent, and agents and owners reaped economic
gain from this. Although the economic gain from ships destroyed by Confederate commerce
raiders was not received until after the war, these owners, released of their physical assets now
had capital that they could invest anywhere. Between insurance payments and claims filed during
the Alabama cases there was liquidity for capitalists to set out and invest in new business.169
Captain Young’s story was an isolated example which for a century and a half
represented the dire situation whalers were in. In actuality, Young’s unique tale of desperation is
not at all indicative of the situation of New Bedford whalers during the war years. Rather than
suffer a pyrrhic victory, whalers were willing to await a more meaningful triumph. Even Young
realized this victory when insurance payments recouped all his losses. To most whaling
historians, his drunken, fruitless stand, which is an abnormality in the historical record at best,
167

Information compiled from Whalemen’s Shipping Lists, 1868-1878.
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Whalemen’s Shipping Lists, 1850 – 1870.
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Numbers compiled from Swift and Allen Collection, New Bedford Whaling Museum;
and Clifford, Clifford, and Crapo Collection, New Bedford Whaling Museum. Information also
compiled from the Financial Records of Matthew Howland, Harvard Business School.
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came to represent how all whalers felt during the war years. Although they were certainly
discouraged by their capture, insurance payments recouped most of their losses.170
This story is a reminder of the paradigm shift that war can bring. As destructive as the
American Civil War was to the nation and New Bedford, it offered the opportunity for change.
Those foresighted enough in New Bedford redirected their investments into industrialization.
This stabilized New Bedford’s economy, and made it sustainable well into the twentieth century.
The American Civil War’s destructiveness made this opportunity possible. Perhaps this is the
greatest irony of war: how something as destructive as war can produce positive effects.

170

Ellis, History of New Bedford, 424-425; Dolan, Leviathan, 329 -331; Chaffin, Sea of
Grey, 275-277.
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